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ABSTRACT
Moral suffering occurs when employees feel constrained by organizational factors
that are perceived as conflicting with their values. Moral suffering has been
conceptualized through moral distress and moral injury, and while both terms have
conceptually similar definitions, no study to date has empirically examined the distinction
between the constructs. Thus, the current study examined the distinction between moral
injury and moral distress, and whether perceived occupational stigma was a moderator of
the relationship between moral suffering and mental health symptoms, meaningful work,
and counterproductive work behaviors. Participants were 479 adults from 20 industries,
who were recruited from Mturk to participate in the study at two time points. Results
from the measurement model indicated a two-factor structure of witness- and
perpetration-based moral suffering. The structural equation models indicated that
witness-based moral suffering uniquely predicted higher mental health symptoms and
lower meaningful work, while perpetration-based moral suffering predicted higher
counterproductive work behaviors. The interactions between moral suffering and
perceived occupational stigma predicting the outcomes exhibited evidence of
suppression. The findings demonstrate that prior research may not be capturing the full
domain of moral suffering by examining moral injury and moral distress separately.
Results showed that both witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering predicted
different factors that contribute to an individual’s wellbeing.
Key words: Moral suffering, moral injury, moral distress, occupational stigma,
wellbeing, mental health symptoms, meaningful work, counterproductive work behaviors
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TRAUMA OR TRAPPED: CONCEPTUALIZING MORAL SUFFERING AND
THE IMPACT OF OCCUPATIONAL STIGMA
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
A doctor who is constrained to stand by as a result of a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
protocol, a journalist who must capture raw footage of war time events as a bystander, a
television producer who receives emails from family members begging them not to air a
show about their loved one’s murder, or a zoo keeper whose love of animals is conflicted
with the regulation to put them in a small cage, all have one thing in common: moral
suffering. When employees believe that the right course of action has not been taken or
has been ignored by supervisors, coworkers, or organizational protocols, they may be at
odds with their moral compass. While an employee is exposed to many stressors
throughout a workday, stressors that contradict an employee’s sense of right and wrong
can have detrimental effects on an employee’s emotional and cognitive wellbeing,
especially when the distress is compounded over time.
Moral Suffering refers to the emotional conflict that results from actions or
exposure as part of one’s work obligations that violate their sense of right and wrong
(Shay, 2011). ‘‘Morals’’ refer to the ethical principles or values held by individuals that
are used to guide their behavior (“Morals,” 2021). Moral suffering has been investigated
in prior research in two forms, moral injury and moral distress. Moral injury occurs as the
“lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, and social impact
of…perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held
moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al., 2009, p. 700). These acts are often associated
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with violence or death-related incidents (Litz et al., 2009). For example, Papazoglou and
Chopko (2017) described a police officer who is bound by protocols to enforce harsh
crowd management. While officers are instructed to do their job, they may not feel right
about enforcing such harsh standards when it comes to a young child who is resisting.
The officer may be bound by organizational constraints to act in a certain way, or
alternatively, observe a coworker being forceful and hurting a child. These
circumstances, whether acted upon themselves or by observing others, can make an
officer question the justification of their required work duties.
While moral injury has primarily been described through circumstances that
involve exposure to violence or death-related incidents, moral distress has been referred
to as the emotional experience that results from individuals making judgements or
decisions about the right course of action but are unable to take them due to internal or
external constraints (Corley, 2002; Jameton, 1984). These decisions that are made are
judged as wrong, but work policy requires it to occur. For example, child welfare service
employees pursue a career with the mindset of keeping children safe, however,
employees have to make decisions about splitting families apart (Kahn, 2019). The
employee may be required by regulations and state law to remove a child from a home,
despite circumstances that the employee may feel is an exception, thus causing a conflict
of decision making.
The mismatch between one’s core beliefs and events that occur can create a threat
to an individual’s internal moral schema (Dombo et al., 2013). The lack in meaning
behind the individual’s experience can result in guilt and shame being associated with
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situation and often manifests in rage, anxiety and depression (Currier, Holland, & Malott,
2015; Dombo et al., 2013; Kruger, 2014). The conceptualization of both moral suffering
components incorporate an appraisal in which many situations have the opportunity to
cause moral suffering to occur, however, it is an individual’s evaluation of the event as
being against their belief of what is right that causes moral suffering.
Prior research has investigated the experience of moral suffering in regard to a
variety of outcomes. Moral suffering has been linked to individual outcomes such as
helplessness and pessimism (Bryan et al., 2016; Elpern et al., 2005), anger (Bryan et al.,
2016; Gutierrez, 2005; Haight et al., 2017; Stein et al., 2012), compassion fatigue (Austin
et al., 2017; Maiden et al., 2011; Morley, 2003; Papazoglou et al., 2019), job satisfaction
(Ando & Kawano, 2018; Elpern et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2018; Hatamizadeh et al., 2019;
Joseph & Deshpande, 1997), burnout (Austin et al., 2017; Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004;
Ohnishi et al., 2010; Piers et al., 2012; Sundin-Huard & Fahy, 1999), and turnover
intentions (Austin et al., 2017; Haight et al., 2016; Hart, 2005; Piers et al., 2012). The
impact of moral suffering goes beyond individual outcomes and can extend to the
organization as well. Research has shown moral suffering can impact performance
(Gutierrez, 2005; McAndrew et al., 2011; Piers et al., 2012; Radzvin, 2011), perceived
quality of care of patients (Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012; Ludwick & Silva, 2003; Meltzer &
Huckabay, 2004) and the professional environment (Berlinger & Berlinger, 2017;
McAndrew et al., 2011). However, the majority of research has been primarily conducted
with the military and healthcare professions, which presents a gap in knowledge of
whether other occupations experience moral suffering and its consequences.
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Purpose of the Current Study
Despite the reference to conflict of moral values being at the core of moral injury
and moral distress, research has not examined the constructs consistently. Some
researchers have examined one of the constructs while ignoring the other, whereas other
researchers refer to the constructs interchangeably as a single entity (Backholm & Idås,
2015; Sugrue, 2019). No study to date has empirically examined the two constructs
concurrently with the goal of assessing the shared and unique variability between the
constructs. Additional research is needed to examine the uniqueness of the constructs and
to understand the impact of moral suffering on the workforce. Research has shown the
impact of moral suffering on many key organizational outcomes; therefore, organizations
should be aware of the circumstances that may be causing their employees to leave the
organization or industry. Knowledge of the presence and impact of moral suffering can
provide a foundation for improvement for organizational change. To date, only two
articles have suggested differing outcomes as a result of moral injury and moral distress,
however, both were theoretical papers recommending research into the domain of moral
suffering in helping professions (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; Sugrue, 2019). The
current study extends the literature by proposing a model, demonstrated in Figure 1, that
illustrates the proposed relationships between both moral suffering constructs and work
outcomes; with the aim to investigate the unique variance that is explained by each
factor.
Additionally, the majority of research investigating moral injury has been
conducted within the military context (Haight et al., 2016). Haight et al. (2016)
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conducted a systematic review of the literature and found that within the 15% of research
that was not with a military sample, only one study was focused on work. Similarly,
moral distress has primary been researched within the healthcare field (Oh & Gastmans,
2015; Sugrue, 2019; Weinberg, 2009). Authors have suggested the need for additional
research into the area of moral suffering on diverse professions, however few occupations
have been examined beyond healthcare and the military (Williamson et al., 2018; 2020).
While moral suffering may be more obvious in military and healthcare contexts, research
is lacking in the understanding of other work environments that could contribute to the
psychological distress that moral suffering creates. Without the knowledge of how moral
suffering may occur in one’s industry, organizations may be proposing changes that are
inadequate to addressing the moral conflicts that employees are experiencing. Time,
effort and money may be wasted on interventions that are not addressing the key issues at
hand. The present study aims to address these gaps.
While the purpose of the current research was to examine the generalization of
moral suffering to all occupational fields, it is unlikely that all occupations are affected
equally. Individuals with a greater perception that they work in a stigmatized occupation
may be more affected by events that transgress against their beliefs than individuals with
a lessor perception of stigma. For example, garbage truck workers, a stigmatized
occupation, is proposed to have stronger reactions to events that transgress their beliefs in
comparison to employees who perceive low occupational stigma. The shame and guilt
that results from the belief that a violation of ethical behavior has occurred, in
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combination with perceived negative appraisal from outsiders may compound the
dysfunctional outcomes individuals experience.
Many individuals gain a sense of purpose from their work, and thus work serves a
major part of their identity (Dik & Duffy, 2009). However, humans are not siloed
creatures; individuals seek validation and approval from their peers, which contributes to
their personal evaluation of their worth (Ashforth, 2001; Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Leary,
2007). Evaluations of worth can be derived from the perceptions of oneself, perceptions
of social groups, and perceptions of society. While an employee may believe in the
greater good that their job plays in society, others may not have the same perspective, and
these differential perspectives can influence an individual’s perception of worth.
Many researchers have conducted qualitative research demonstrating the
awareness employees have regarding the perception of stigma that is associated with their
work (Davis, 1984; Gold, 1964; Levin & Arluke, 1987; McIntyre, 1987; Ouellet, 2010;
Palmer, 1978; Perry, 1978; Petrillo, 1990; Rollins, 1985; Stephens, 1974; Thompson,
1991). Whether outsiders actually believe the stated perception, individuals experience
‘paranoid social cognition,’ where they tend to ruminate on false perceptions from others,
which can cause suspicion and distrust regarding others’ intentions (Kramer, 1998).
Benjamin et al. (2011) found that members of stigmatized occupations, specifically
cleaners in their study, preferred to hide who they worked for in order to avoid the social
criticism. In order to overcome the perceptions of the public, many individuals who work
in stigmatized occupations tend to rely on the support of coworkers and the justification
of the purpose of their work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2014). However, when actions of
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ingroup members or organizational factors contradict one’s sense of right and wrong,
such as in moral suffering, individuals are more likely to feel disidentified with their
work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2014; Kreiner et al., 2006; Lai et al., 2013). Figure 1
illustrates the proposed relationships between moral suffering and mental health
symptoms, meaningful work, and counterproductive work behaviors, moderated by
perceived occupational stigma.
Based on the lack of consensus on the conceptual definition, measurement, and
occupations impacted by moral suffering, the current study aimed to address three goals.
The first aim was to extend the literature on moral suffering to examine the frequency
and intensity of moral injury and distress in a wide range of professions. Secondly, the
current study examined the distinction between moral injury and moral distress, both
conceptually and statistically, and whether the constructs predicted different outcomes
uniquely. Finally, the third aim was to examine the role of perceived occupational stigma
on the proposed relationships. The extent to which an individual perceives their
occupation is stigmatized may magnify the effects of moral suffering on mental health
symptoms, meaningful work, and counterproductive work behaviors.
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CHAPTER TWO: MORAL SUFFERING LITERATURE REVIEW
Moral suffering occurs when an individual’s moral integrity is perceived to be at
stake (Kelly, 1998). Moral integrity has been described as “living up to one’s personal
moral code, so that one can sleep at night, or live with oneself, having demonstrated
courage, patience, and perseverance in the face of conflict” (Laabs, 2011, p. 431).
Human’s seek validation and perceive their sense of self-worth comes from clear values
that are congruent with one’s actions and perceptions (Hardingham, 2004). Value system
theory states that an individual’s values and value system motivate their behavior
(Rokeach, 1973). When individuals perceive that they must go against their value system,
conflict occurs. Corley et al. (2001) suggested that conflict stems from the need for
autonomy, where individuals seek “the power to do what one recognizes should be
done”, but can not follow through with that decision or action (p. 251). When the
situation hinders an individual’s ability to act in accordance with their value system, they
gain a sense of powerlessness, and moral suffering may occur.
In the workplace, many stakeholders play a role in organizational decision
making. Therefore, decisions made and actions taken by employees do not occur in a silo;
internal and external constraints can form a barrier that impedes an individual’s ability to
act in accordance with their values. When an individual holds internal beliefs about the
way work should be conducted, and they or those around them act in an opposing
manner, the tension that arises puts in question one’s sense of moral integrity. Internal
constraints can include perceived power to influence the outcome such as lack of
knowledge, fear of losing one’s job, self-doubt, or conflict aversion (Hamric et al., 2006;
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Haug, 2018; Weinberg, 2009). External constraints that promote conflict can be team
member power imbalances, poor communication, pressure to reduce costs, fear of legal
action, and policies that conflict with patient/student needs (Haug, 2018; Jameton, 1993).
Consistent with many stressor-strain theories propose, moral suffering is a result
of an individual’s particular appraisal of the stressor. Moral suffering is a specific
example of the Transactional Theory of Stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) applied to
individuals considering the implications of situations as going against their beliefs. The
Transactional Theory of Stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) states that individuals
appraise the situation first, determining whether they perceive the stressor as challenge or
a threat to their wellbeing. Not every individual will appraise the same situation the same
way. An event that may conflict with one individual’s values or perceived obligations
may be interpreted differently by another, and therefore the second individual may not
interpret a threat to their moral integrity and internal conflict will not occur (Epstein &
Delgado, 2010). Thus, moral suffering is a result of the interaction between the situation
and the individual’s evaluation of the transgression. Two different types of transgressions
have been examined to a great extent, moral distress and moral injury.
Moral Distress
Philosopher Andrew Jameton (1984) first conceptualized the experience of moral
distress in the clinical ethics literature. He described moral distress as "when one knows
the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the
right course of action" (Jameton, 1984, p. 6). Jameton (1984) suggested that individuals
feel a sense of responsibility by participating in the event and are unable to influence the
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outcomes based on the restricted circumstances, which leads to internal conflict.
Wilkinson (1987) refined the definition to a “psychological disequilibrium and negative
feeling state experienced when a person makes a moral decision but does not follow
through by performing the moral behavior indicated by that decision” (p. 16). Wilkinson
(1987) noted that the failure to follow through or fight against the perceived immoral
event is not based on an individual’s irresponsibility but on institutional constraints
limiting their ability to do so, and thus includes the aspect of moral judgement, as well as
decision making, since most of the time individuals were unable to act on their
judgements (Jameton, 1984).
Based on Wilkinson’s (1987) critiques and development of knowledge on moral
distress, Jameton (1993) developed his conceptualization further. Jameton (1993)
suggested that there were two underlying processes that both he and Wilkinson were
referring to. Jameton (1984) stated his early conceptualization referred to the initial
conflict that an individual experiences, which he referred to as ‘initial’ stress. Jameton
(1993) stated that initial stress occurs when an individual “feels frustration, anger, and
anxiety when faced with the institutional obstacles that conflicts with their values” (p.
544). The immediate frustration and sense of conflict with personal values that the
individual experiences, is initial distress. The employee believes they know the correct
action to take but are unable to due to the risk involved in speaking up, possible
unpleasantness, extra work, and cooperation of higher management to overturn the
decision. Individuals feel a moral responsibility in the situation, however, often cannot
handle the additional burden of fighting the system (Jameton, 1993).
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After the initial stress occurs, Jameton (1984) clarified that Wilkinson’s (1989)
definition was referring to the aftermath of the event, ‘reactive distress’. Reactive distress
is the compounded distress that results from not acting or changing the results of the
initial distressing event, causing guilt, anxiety and shame (Jameton, 1993). Wilkinson
(1989) had described crying, depression, nightmares, feelings of worthlessness, heart
palpitations, diarrhea and headaches as some of the effects of morally distressing events
(Wilkinson, 1987, p. 23). Reactive stress involves thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that
occur as a result of the initial stress event.
Since its first conceptualization, researchers have continued to refine the
definition of moral distress. Corley et al. (2005) described the “painful feelings and/or
psychological disequilibrium that occurs when nurses are conscious of the morally
appropriate action a situation requires but cannot carry out that action because of
institutionalized obstacles” such as institutional policies, lack of time, and professional
protocols (p. 382). Crane et al. (2013) suggested an expansion of the current definitions
to “distress that occurs as a consequence of the transgression of one’s personal moral and
ethical frameworks, irrespective of how such transgressions emerge” (p.2). Webster and
Baylis (2000) broadened the definition to include failing to pursue a course of action,
“when one fails to pursue what one believes is the right course of action (or fails to do so
to one’s satisfaction)” (p.15). As the discrepancies between these definitions shows,
Hamric (2012) and Lützén and Kvist (2012) have critiqued the literature on moral
distress as having a lack of agreement in numerous definitions across studies.
Moral Residue
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Evidence has suggested that repeated exposure to moral distress can increase the
adverse impact of distress over the course of time. Jameton (1993) originated the concept
of the ‘lingering’ effects of moral distress as reactive distress, however researchers have
investigated and recognized the unique adverse effects of reactive distress and moral
residue differ (Epstein & Hamric, 2009). Whereas reactive distress is the emotional toll
that the morally distressing event takes on an individual’s wellbeing, moral residue is the
rise in moral sensitivity as a result of repeated moral distress. Webster and Bayliss (2000)
conceptualized the term ‘moral residue’ as the lasting psychological impact of moral
distress from repeated exposure. Webster and Bayliss (2000) stated that moral residue is
what “each of us carries with us from those times in our lives when in the face of moral
distress we have seriously compromised ourselves or allowed ourselves to be
compromised” (p. 208). The more morally distressing events an individual experiences at
work, an increased “moral wound of having had to act against one’s values remains”
(Epstein & Delgado, 2010).
Epstein and Hamric (2009) progressed the knowledge of moral residue further by
describing the ‘Crescendo Effect.’ Each time an individual experiences a morally
distressing event, the individual experiences a ‘moral distress crescendo’ where the
emotional experience of moral distress builds up, perhaps starting as frustration but then
progressing into symptoms of trauma such as anxiety or nightmares. Even when the
distressing situation has resolved or over time the specific situation may have faded in
perceived importance or relevance, the emotional toll does not go back to baseline.
Instead, moral residue forms a new baseline for when the individual experiences a
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morally distressing event and the impact of moral distress is increased through increased
level of residual moral distress (Epstein & Delgado, 2010). Epstein and Delgado (2010)
state that moral residue rises gradually having a cumulative effect as morally distressing
events that occur in particular settings where individuals work, tend to be similar over
time. Thomas and McCollough (2014) stated that “while each episode may seem
manageable, their cumulative effect may not be” (p. 115). Epstein and Hamric (2009)
described the consequences of moral residue as emotional numbing to the ethically
challenging situations, conscientious objecting, and burnout.
Moral Distress Distinctions
While there exists a considerable amount of research on moral distress, key
distinctions between components of moral distress have been ignored. One important
distinction to make within the moral distress framework is between the frequency and
intensity of moral distress. Prior researchers have inconsistently defined and measured
moral distress by adapting existing measures to suit the correct audience, and this
inconsistent use of measurement tools likely contributes to the differing effect sizes in
outcomes (Hamric, 2012). Epstein and Delgado (2010) stated “because values and
obligations are perceived differently by various members of the healthcare team, moral
distress is an experience of the individual rather than an experience of the situation” (p.
4). Therefore, the frequency of moral distress refers to the amount of exposure an
individual has to various situations that are likely to conflict with one’s morals. In
contrast, the intensity of moral distress is referred to as the degree to which the morally
distressing situation has inflicted distress, or a troubled conscience (Glasberg et al.,
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2006). While the frequency of morally distressing events can increase moral distress, the
degree to which an individual appraises the event as being against their beliefs is what
causes a stress response to occur. It is important to acknowledge the differences between
the two components of moral distress, as researchers have found that the events that
occur most frequently are not always the situations that cause the greatest level of distress
(Corley, 1995; Corley et al., 2001; McAndrew et al., 2011).
Past research has demonstrated how these two perspectives can differ in the
prediction of outcomes (Corley, 2002; Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012; Mobley et al., 2007;
Ohnishi et al., 2010). Ohnishi and colleagues (2010) measured both the frequency and
intensity of moral distress and found that although psychiatric nurses reported a high
frequency of morally distressing situations, they reported low levels of intensity of moral
distress. Their findings indicate that the frequency of moral distressing events did not
always determine the intensity of moral distress and the findings suggest that differing
underlying factors may increase the intensity felt. In order to be clear and consistent, the
current study will refer and measure the frequency of exposure as the occurrence of
morally distressing events, and the disequilibrium felt as an outcome to those events will
be referred to as moral distress.
The second key distinction that is not often clarified within the moral distress
literature is the referent of cause. Research has defined moral distress as being an event
where the individual is either forced to make a decision or constrained out of a decision
based on external factors. The occurrence of moral distress then is a result of either
individuals themselves perceiving that they must act in a way that is against their moral
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beliefs or standby and observe others, such coworkers or management, act in a way that
conflicts with their beliefs. Researchers vary on the extent to which they incorporate both
types of referent in their measurements, but research suggests key differences in
outcomes due to the referent in the situation.
For example, prior work has suggested that one of the leading causes of moral
distress for nurses is being required to carry out unnecessary tests and treatments (Corley,
1995). Researchers have suggested that nurses feel conflicted as they perceived
themselves as being in a better position to understand the patients’ needs as they typically
spend more time by the bedside, which may conflict with the physician’s treatment plan
(Hamric & Blackhall, 2007). In these situations, nurses do not have the power to
influence a decision but are bound by authority or protocol to act in a way that is against
their beliefs. Similarly, nurses report moral distress as a result of the provision of
aggressive care that is not seen as beneficial to the patient (Corley et al., 2005). The
nurses describe observing physicians or other nurses treating the patient in a way they do
not agree with but cannot intervene as a result of team cohesion, lack of confidence, or
organizationally stated procedures. Jameton (1993) described how moral distress is most
often a result of an individual’s sense of moral responsibility to the situation. He stated
that whether the individual was making the decision themselves, or having to witness
others, they feel an obligation to do what’s right as a participant in the situation. It is this
conflict between what they perceive as right and what is actually done that leads to
feelings of guilt and shame.
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The concept of moral distress resembles constructs such as ethical dilemmas and
role conflict, however, researchers have stated there are differences among each
conceptual framework. Jameton (1993) distinguished the concept of moral distress from
moral or ethical dilemmas, stating that moral dilemmas occur when two ‘different and
important values conflict, but no choice presents itself that preserves both’ (Jameton,
1993, p. 542). Moral or ethical dilemmas can have two opposing decisions, where neither
option is more beneficial than the other but each “can be defended as viable and
appropriate” (Weinberg, 2009, p. 144). In contrast, moral distress occurs when an
individual makes a moral judgment about a case in which he or she is involved and the
institution or co-workers make it difficult or impossible for the [individual] to act on that
judgement” (Jameton, 1993, p. 542). Moral distress occurs as the individual feels
responsible for making or complying with an unethical decision because they feel as
though they are restricted by circumstance (Corley, 2002; Weinberg, 2009). Jameton
(1993) stated that medical schools often discuss the concepts of moral dilemmas, and not
moral distress, as dilemmas can teach students the choice making system. However,
moral distress implies ‘wrongdoing’ and questioning the bureaucracy, social issues and
leadership within the healthcare system (Epstein & Delgado, 2010; Jameton, 1993).
Researchers have also clarified the difference between moral distress and role
conflict. House and Rizzo (1972) defined role conflict as the stress that results from
multiple competing or conflicting expectations. Where role conflict deals with the
competing demands directed by different authorities, an individual may be conflicted
about who to respond to or what tasks have priority, but the situation does not involve a
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decision in which the employee believes wrong or against their value system. Moral
distress involves the internal conflict of what they are required to do, versus what they
feel they should do.
Previous Research on Moral Distress
The moral distress literature has incorporated various definitions, referents, and
related constructs. However, one aspect that has remained consistent is the focus on the
healthcare industry. In a review of the literature from 1987 to 2018, over 750 published
articles discuss moral distress, however, all but four were published in medical journals
(Sugrue, 2019). Research has been conducted within many healthcare professions such as
physicians (Austin et al., 2017; W. Austin et al., 2005; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007),
nurses (Austin et al., 2017; Corley et al., 2005; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Hatamizadeh
et al., 2019; Ludwick & Silva, 2003), including psychiatric nurses (Ando & Kawano,
2018; Ohnishi et al., 2010), critical care nurses (Asgari et al., 2019; Corley, 1995; Elpern
et al., 2005; Haghighinezhad et al., 2019; Maiden et al., 2011; McAndrew et al., 2011;
Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004; Mobley et al., 2007), correctional nurses (Sasso et al., 2018),
geriatric nurses (Piers et al., 2012), surgical nurses (Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012), nurse
educators (Duarte et al., 2017), neonatal intensive care units (Cavaliere et al., 2010),
humanitarian workers in a healthcare setting (Hunt, 2008), occupational therapists (Penny
et al., 2016), pharmacists (Sporrong et al., 2005), respiratory therapists (Schwenzer &
Wang, 2006), and anesthetists (Radzvin, 2011). See Sugrue (2020) and Hanna (2004) for
a full review.
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Studies have reported that some of the highest predictors of moral distress were
feeling compelled to provide care that seems ineffective (Austin et al., 2017), lack of
resources (Kälvemark et al., 2004), perceived organizational justice (Haghighinezhad et
al., 2019), unwarranted aggressive treatment (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007), high security
protocols providing a lack of perceived autonomy (Hunt, 2008; Sasso et al., 2018),
conflicts of interest (Kälvemark et al., 2004), and issues with perceived distrust in the
employee’s competence (Hunt, 2008; Pergert et al., 2019; Sasso et al., 2018). Selfcriticism and self-blame are major factors in how the individuals judged their actions
against “their moral convictions and their standards of what a good nurse would do”
(Kelly, 1998, p. 1134).
In much of the literature, nurses are the primary sample of interest. Researchers
have found that nurses are often portrayed as victims, being bound by the decisions and
authority of higher physicians who are seen as instigating ‘aggressive care’ (Hamric &
Blackhall, 2007; Prentice et al., 2016). However, other researchers have found that nurses
who had more authority are exposed to more demands and thus may be more likely to be
morally sensitive and increase their likelihood for moral distress in comparison with
nurses with less authority (Ohnishi et al., 2010).
Despite the wide variety of healthcare professions represented within the moral
distress literature, very few have explored the impact of moral distress outside of the
healthcare profession (Hanna, 2004; Sugrue, 2019). Researchers have theorized and
requested a call to action to investigate fields such as social work (Weinberg, 2009) and
police officers (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017), however they did not empirically test their
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theory. Other samples that have been assessed include social workers (Kuip, 2016; Lev &
Ayalon, 2018), teachers (Meierstein Ford, 2006; Vehviläinen et al., 2018), and student
affairs personnel (Haug, 2018). However, these studies were bound by small samples
sizes and cross-sectional analyses.
Interestingly, some empirical research exists beyond the scope of healthcare, but
researchers have failed to specifically define the domain of research as ‘moral distress.’
Instead, research has examined ‘moral challenges’ with veterinarians (Crane et al., 2015;
Moses et al., 2018), ‘paradoxical psychological demands’ experienced among child
welfare agency workers (Kahn, 2019), and moral identity with teachers (Santoro, 2013).
While Jameton (1984) originally theorized the construct of moral distress within the
healthcare domain, it is unlikely that the internal conflict between personal and
professional values would be limited to only the healthcare professions. Weinburg (2009)
suggested the rationale for the predominance of research being conducted in healthcare
could be a result of the dramatic and concrete consequences of moral distress, such as
patient pain and death, which are more clear than outcomes faced by other professions.
However, employees in many professions are bound by professional and legal
factors that may not always serve the best interests of their clients, customers, or the
outcomes of the work. For example, marketing agents who must develop content for
products they believe are unsafe, bank tellers who must enforce discriminatory loan
agreements, or sales workers who are encouraged to deceive their clients may also
experience moral distress. Popular press articles have featured examples of moral distress
such as, “Roger Boisjoly, 73, Dies; Warned of Shuttle Danger” (Martin, 2012). Roger
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Boisjoly was an engineer who adamantly warned leadership about the dangers of
launching the Challenger shuttle, however, his warnings were ignored, and the shuttle
exploded. Roger Boisjoly experienced moral distress from his inability to influence the
launch decision despite having the knowledge he thought was neccessary. The findings
from previous work within the healthcare field could be applied more broadly with other
industries, replacing ‘patient’ with the audience an employee serves. The fact that moral
distress has not been looked at past the healthcare field is a concern for organizational
science. Employees may be experiencing these moral stressors regularly and not be
provided the resources and aid that they require, increasing the risk to poor organizational
outcomes.
Outcomes of Moral Distress
Researchers have been interested in outcomes of moral distress ever since
Jameton’s (1984) book, ‘Nursing Practice: The Ethical Issues’ suggested that when
individuals feel opposition between their personal and professional values, engagement
would be disrupted. Kuip (2016) and other researchers have supported this claim, finding
that social workers who experienced high moral distress showed less enthusiasm,
inspiration and vigor towards their role (Lawrence, 2011; Mason et al., 2014). Other
research has found direct links from increased moral distress to lower job, career and
income satisfaction (Ando & Kawano, 2018; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Hatamizadeh et
al., 2019; Schluter et al., 2008; Schwenzer & Wang, 2006).
High levels of moral distress have also been significantly related to secondary
traumatic stress and burnout in physicians and nurses (Austin et al., 2017; Maiden et al.,

20

2011). Meltzer and Huckabay (2004) found that moral distress accounted for 10% of the
variance in emotional exhaustion but was not related to the depersonalization or personal
accomplishment dimensions of burnout. Interestingly, the researchers only found this
significant relationship between moral distress frequency but not intensity. However, in
contradiction to these results, Ohnishi et al. (2010) found that nurses with high frequency
and intensity of moral distress experienced higher levels of both emotional exhaustion
and cynicism. In another qualitative study of child welfare agency workers, researchers
found that employees attempted to protect themselves from the impact of moral distress
by avoiding thoughts about the event, resulting in reduced emotional availability to their
clients and coworkers, emotional exhaustion and isolation (Kahn, 2019).
While moral distress begins as an internal struggle, consequences outside of the
individual have also been examined. Researchers have found nurses with higher moral
distress had lower satisfaction with quality of care (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007), poor
respect for patient rights (Hatamizadeh et al., 2019), and increased perception of medical
errors (Maiden et al., 2011) and quality of care (Fogel, 2007; McAndrew et al., 2011).
Additionally, McClendon and Buckner (2007) found that nurses reported that their
experience of moral distress influenced their professional practice due to burnout,
difficulty focusing, having little patience, and feeling ineffective as a nurse. However,
one study found that nurses reported that moral distress did not affect the care they
provided, but the majority of participants admitted they were less involved with the
patient’s family (Gutierrez, 2005).
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Moral distress has also been associated with team dynamics. Research has
demonstrated that moral distress can have an impact on a work team due to lower
perception of collaboration (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007) and increased distrust of
coworker competency for care (Cronqvist & Nyström, 2007; Fogel, 2007). Specifically,
one study found that the intensity of moral distress was significantly related to physiciannurse relationship quality and the frequency of moral distress was predictive of perceived
leadership and support, participation in hospital affairs, collegial relationships, and
staffing adequacy (McAndrew et al., 2011). Implications of these studies are evident, as
internal conflict that an individual feels influences outcomes beyond just the individual.
One of the most common outcomes investigated by researchers has been the
association between moral distress and the intentions to leave one’s position (Austin et
al., 2017; Corley, 1995; Fernandez-Parsons et al., 2013; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007;
Hatamizadeh et al., 2019; Kuip, 2016; Penny et al., 2014; Piers et al., 2012; Sasso et al.,
2018; Schwenzer & Wang, 2006, 2006). In one study, researchers found that 45% of
participants reported having left or considered leaving their position because of the moral
distress that they had experienced (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007). These results have been
supported in a sample of emergency nurses, finding that 6.6% of the nurses attributed
moral distress as the reason for leaving a previous position, 20% said that they had
considered leaving a position but did not, and 13.3% stated that they are currently
considering leaving their position (Fernandez-Parsons et al., 2013).
Summary of Moral Distress
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The moral distress literature has exponentially increased over recent years,
expanding knowledge and application cross culturally from the United States to Australia
(Crane et al., 2015), Belgium (Piers et al., 2012), Japan (Ohnishi et al., 2010), Israel
(Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012), Sweden (Pergert et al., 2019; Sporrong et al., 2005), Finland
(Mänttäri-van der Kuip, 2016), and Iran (Hatamizadeh et al., 2019). However, despite
being seen across the globe, research on moral distress has not been unified.
Researchers continue to argue for new and developed definitions and models of
moral distress, with not much agreement on a single model to move forward with.
Researchers argue that definitions are missing important components and there is lack of
consistency across the conceptual frameworks, however it may be that some authors are
incorporating aspects of similar constructs like moral injury which potentially
contaminates findings and implications. Thus, the present study used, Corley’s (2002)
definition of “the psychological disequilibrium that occurs when [individuals] are
conscious of the morally appropriate action a situation requires, but cannot carry out that
action because of institutionalized obstacles” (p. 382). Previous work examining moral
distress has limited scope outside of the healthcare industry (Kahn, 2019; Kuip, 2016;
Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017). As a result, much of what is known about moral distress
may have limited transferability to external professional roles. However, many
occupations experience similar situations of institutional constraints that question the
bureaucracy, leadership, and social issues beyond health care. A similar trend of limited
empirical knowledge outside of one industry has also been found with the research of
moral injury within the military domain.
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Moral Injury
Similar to moral distress, moral injury describes the experience of when an
individual is faced with a situation that transgresses against their deeply held beliefs.
However, in contrast to moral distress, moral injury involves situations of actions or
violence that lead to harm of other individuals, rather than judgement of decision making.
In the books ‘Achilles in Vietnam: Combat trauma and the undoing of character’ (Shay,
1994) and ‘Odysseus in America: Combat trauma and the trials of homecoming’ (Shay,
2003), Jonathon Shay described moral injury as one of the adverse effects of war. Shay
(2003) portrayed moral injury as situations where “there has been a betrayal of what’s
right, by someone who holds legitimate authority, in a high-stakes situation” (Shay, 2003,
p. 240). Moral injury was said to occur as a result of individuals receiving and obeying
“authorized yet immoral orders” and observing horrors of war (Hodgson & Carey, 2017).
Many researchers have proposed similar conceptualizations that expand on Shay’s
(2003) original definition to varying degrees. Drescher et al. (2011) described moral
injury as the “disruption in an individual’s confidence and expectations about one’s own
or others’ motivations or capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner” (p. 9). Other
researchers have similarly defined moral injury as, “the damage done to our moral
fiber…[which] sacrifice[s] our moral integrity” (Boudreau, 2011, p. 749), “a wound in
the soul” (Brock & Lettini, 2011, p. 1), which “overwhelm[s] one’s sense of goodness
and humanity” (Sherman, 2015, p. 8). The major theme that exists throughout the
proposed definitions is how moral injury harms the person’s sense of other people and
how the world operates. The events that transgress their beliefs, cause the individual to
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lose faith in humanity and their beliefs in a just-world (Drescher et al., 2011).
Researchers have found that rumination of the event and lack of self-forgiveness for
one’s involvement, leads to moral injury (Litz et al., 2009).
One of the most cited adopted definitions has been provided by Litz et al. (2009),
who defined moral injury as “the lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral,
and social impact of perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that
transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (p. 695). The authors refined the
original definition to be applicable more broadly and specifically to situations that
transgress one’s beliefs. The authors state that actively participating in or witnessing
cruel actions and failing to prevent those cruel acts can conflict with one’s moral values.
Litz et al. (2009) suggested that moral transgressions interfere with an individual’s
personal expectations about the way in which individuals should behave. As a result,
individuals question themselves, and those around them, as to why a situation was able to
occur, resulting in guilt and shame from participating in the event. When individuals are
unable to integrate events into their mental schemas (views of the world), they will
experience “guilt, shame, and anxiety about potential direct personal consequences” (p.
698).
Since its first conceptualization, numerous authors have continued to develop and
refine the concept of moral injury (see Hodgson & Carey, 2017). In their review of the
literature, Hodgson and Carey (2017) compared researchers’ definitions and concluded
that research has refocused from Shay’s (2003) original description of the target of
distress being those in ‘legitimate authority’ to “focusing specifically upon the behavior
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of the individual - who may or may not be impacted by leadership or organizational
decisions” (p. 1214). Where Shay (2003) emphasized the perceived betrayal in the failure
of leadership (‘authority’), researchers have since adapted the definition to focus on the
perceived failure of the individual as a result of leadership, where an act that the
individual engaged in or failed to prevent (as directed by leadership), is perceived as
morally ‘wrong.’ One of the core concepts of moral injury inherent in many of the
definitions is the perceived betrayal that an individual feels. Betrayal stems from the
individual feeling forced to act in a way that is against their beliefs, resulting in
perceptions of disloyalty and distrust from the person, protocol or power that enforced the
order. As a result, many researchers have suggested the conceptual framework includes
differences in moral injury that includes actions by self, actions by others, and betrayal.
Moral Injury Residue
While moral injury has been heavily investigated within the military, no empirical
data has been examined on the residue that may occur from moral injury. Unlike the
moral distress literature, where researchers have conceptually defined moral residue as a
result of accumulated moral distress and the crescendo effect (see prior section), the
moral injury literature has not specifically addressed the increased likelihood of being
effected by moral transgressions. However, studies have suggested similar phenomena
may occur. In their findings from police officers who were exposed to chronic trauma,
McCormack and Riley (2016) described a domino effect in the officer’s reports of
diminishing self-worth and described the occurrence as the ‘eroded identity’ over time.
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Further, Litz et al. (2009) described how poor integration of events and one’s
moral schema leads to lingering psychological distress. The researchers discussed that
over time, individuals convince themselves that their actions are unforgiveable, leading to
rumination about one’s participation in the event. Failing to avoid these thoughts,
individuals tend to engage in withdrawal and self-condemnation behaviors, replicating
symptoms of PTSD (reexperiencing, avoidance, and emotional numbing). Therefore, it is
likely that as individuals experience moral injury over time, moral residue and the
crescendo effect may still occur.
Moral Injury Distinctions
Similar to the literature on moral distress, prior researchers have distinguished
between the outcomes that results from the frequency and intensity of transgressions that
occur. The term ‘potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIES)’ has been used by
many researchers to refer to the event that precedes the appraisal process (Bryan et al.,
2016; Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; Drescher et al., 2011). Many researchers
have measured moral injury with the assumption that specific events are tied to adverse
outcomes (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; Nash et al., 2013). However, exposure
to questionable events does not necessarily lead to adverse outcomes for every individual.
For example, two employees may be restricted from helping a coworker in a dangerous
situation, however only one may feel guilt from not intervening and aiding the coworker.
In their review of the literature, Griffin et al. (2019) concluded that “exposure to
potentially morally injurious events should not be equated with morally injurious
outcomes, per se” (p. 356). Research findings have shown that the appraisal of the event
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is a key determinant of whether the individual will experience morally injurious
outcomes. Preliminary evidence has suggested that measures of exposure to PMIEs are
less strongly associated with mental and behavioral health problems than instruments
designed to assess morally injurious outcomes, such as guilt associated with the event
(Currier et al., 2018; Koenig et al., 2018).
The second distinction that researchers have made within the literature is the
referent of who engaged in the morally injurious action. Inherent in almost all of the
moral injury definitions is the idea that individuals either witness or perpetrate acts that
transgress deeply held beliefs (Carey et al., 2016; Litz et al., 2009). Researchers have
continuously stressed the importance of other versus self-engaged morally injurious
events, stating that while both lead to moral injury, unique underlying processes may
occur for the two sources (Drescher et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2017; Litz et al., 2009). For
example, Stein et al. (2012) found that ‘moral injury by self’ was the best predictor of
severity of reexperiencing symptoms and two out of three dimensions of guilt (hindsight
bias/responsibility, and wrong doing), however, ‘moral injury by others’ only predicted
state anger. Additionally, Papazoglou et al. (2019) found that perpetrating morally
injurious events uniquely predicted compassion fatigue and PTSD symptoms, whereas
witnessing morally injurious events was not a significant predictor in their sample.
However, other researchers have found conflicting results. Bryan et al. (2016) found that
witnessing morally injurious was most strongly associated with posttraumatic stress and
perpetrating morally injurious events was most strongly associated with hopelessness,
pessimism, and anger. Nonetheless, while research has found conflicting results of which

28

morally injurious dimension is the strongest predictor of outcomes, evidence is clear that
unique effects occur for witnessing verses perpetrating the event themselves.
The final key distinction that is important to note within the moral injury literature
is the conceptual similarities with constructs such as post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). While there are similarities in the concepts, researchers have theoretically and
empirically distinguished the two (Dennis et al., 2017; Farnsworth et al., 2019; Griffin et
al., 2019; Litz et al., 2009). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) recognizes that PTSD is a “syndrome of
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive symptoms including intense anxiety, nightmares,
hyperarousal, and flashbacks that are triggered by exposure to traumatic external events”.
The DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) holds that the “essential feature” of
the disorder is “exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor” which is limited to an event
where death or serious physical injury is threatened (American Psychiatric Association,
2013, p. 463).
While PTSD can result from experiencing natural disasters (e.g., forest fires or
hurricanes), or manmade crises (e.g., war), moral injury predominately results from
manmade crises as interpersonal violence is volitional behavior that can be evaluated as
transgressing moral beliefs. Moral injury occurs to the extent that humans are responsible
for the bad actions that occur. During a natural disaster, moral injury would only result
from human action that was perceived as morally wrong following the event, such as
intentionally failing to help others who have been harmed; whereas interpersonal
violence always involves human action from the start. For example, individuals who
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experience wartime violence may experience PTSD symptoms due to witnessing and/or
engaging in violent behavior, however violence and killing are ‘expected’ in war as a
normative part of the solider experience. When the violence involves questioning
ethically correct actions, such as those involving children or innocent bystanders, can
lead to moral injury. It is the subjective interpretation of the meaning that is attributed to
actions and observations, that contributes to the result of moral injury (Litz et al., 2009).
Furthermore, Litz et al. (2009) summarized that when traumatic events occur, an
individual who experiences PTSD feels dissonance about threats to their wellbeing.
Whereas moral injury occurs when the individuals are faced with trauma but cannot
comprehend the justification behind the action as being the ‘right course of action.’
Other researchers, such as Dennis et al. (2017), described how outcomes of moral
injury are predictive of PTSD symptoms; thus, moral injury may be a precursor to PTSD.
Research has shown that associations between morally injurious experiences and PTSD
have ranged from small to moderate (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; Currier,
Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015; Nash et al., 2013). Dennis et al. (2017) stated that
when individuals experienced war time atrocities that they believed violated their
standards of what was acceptable, they felt increased guilt associated with the event.
However, it was when individuals were unable to come to terms with their guilt that they
experienced the PTSD symptoms of reexperiencing the event, avoidance and
hyperarousal (Dennis et al., 2017).
Litz et al. (2009) provided an in-depth examination of the construct distinctions
and stated that a possible reason for the limited amount of research in the area of moral
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injury (at that time) was due mental health professionals associating military members
with the focus on life-threating trauma typical of war, and failing to pay sufficient
attention to the impact of events with moral and ethical implications. Litz et al. (2009)
also stated that clinicians who sense moral conflict in their client may associate moral
violations as being outside the realm of their expertise, recommending religious
counseling instead. However, as research developed in the area of moral injury, it is clear
psychologists should be aware of the impact both on the individual and organizational
outcomes. In summary, moral injury is not a syndrome or disorder in itself, however, it
can be viewed as accompanying or a precursor to PTSD symptomology.
Morally Injurious Events
The development of knowledge of the impact of moral injury has primarily been
conducted within the military setting. Researchers have assessed war veterans (Currier,
Holland, & Malott, 2015; Currier, McCormick, & Drescher, 2015; Dennis et al., 2017;
Evans et al., 2018; Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016, 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014;
Vargas et al., 2013; Worthen & Ahern, 2014), active duty military (Bryan et al., 2014;
Bryan et al., 2013, 2016; Stein et al., 2012), armed forces intelligence personnel (Ogle et
al., 2018), deployed nurses and physicians (Conway, 2013; Gibbons et al., 2013),
deployed healthcare and religious professionals such as chaplains, academic researchers,
and policymakers (Drescher et al., 2011). Within the military, soldiers are frequently
exposed to morally injurious events due to the nature of work. Moral injury occurs as
violence extends outside of what is perceived as ‘normal wartime behaviors,’ and
individuals develop negative self-appraisals which can influence their self-identity and

31

cause emotional withdrawal and poor mental wellbeing (Dombo et al., 2013). Moral
injury stems from feeling remorse about one’s own behavior or feeling guilty for being
associated with the actions of others (Litz et al., 2009). Qualitative studies with clergy,
mental health providers, and Vietnam veterans have shed light on the sources of moral
injury. In one study, clergy and mental health providers described acts of betrayal; acts of
disproportionate violence inflicted on others; incidents involving death or harm to
civilians; and within ranks violence (Drescher et al., 2011; Gibbons et al., 2013; Vargas
et al., 2013). The researchers also found that moral injury was linked to increased social
problems such as isolation or aggression; trust issues such as problems with intimacy;
spiritual changes including loss of faith; existential issues such as fatalism or sorrow; and
negative views of self (Drescher et al., 2011; Gibbons et al., 2013; Vargas et al., 2013).
Currier, McCormick and Drescher (2015) have suggested four clusters reflecting
different circumstances within which morally injurious events may occur: organizational
circumstances, such as when leadership is perceived as out of touch with work;
environmental circumstances, such as having difficulty identifying threats or civilians;
cultural and social circumstances, such as dehumanizing the enemy, and psychological
circumstances, such as having a revenge mindset, contribute to how an individual
develops moral injury.
Despite the widespread examination of moral injury research amongst the
military, few researchers have established justification for moral injury outside of the
military domain. Studies have included nonmilitary samples of teachers (Currier,
Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015; Sugrue, 2020), police officers (Komarovskaya et al.,
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2011; Papazoglou et al., 2019), child protective system personnel (Haight et al., 2017),
and journalists (Backholm & Idås, 2015; Browne et al., 2012). Other researchers have
suggested that moral injury is relevant to first responders (Benedek et al., 2007), teachers
(Keefe-Perry, 2018; Levinson, 2015), prison staff, supermarket personnel and delivery
drivers and frontline workers of the Coronavirus pandemic (Williamson et al., 2020).
However, empirical data has not yet been provided to support these claims.
Many authors have critiqued the limited settings that moral injury research has
been conducted. Authors have argued that “moral injury may be applied beyond the
battlefield to nonmilitary clients who also experience the emotional effects of their own
actions that violate the dictates of their moral compass” (Dombo et al., 2013, p. 198;
Griffin et al., 2019; Williamson et al., 2018, 2020). Empirical evidence supports these
claims that moral injury may be found in other occupations. In one study of child
protective service workers, employees had increased rates of moral injury due to underresourced systems, problematic professionals, unfair laws and policies, abusive parents,
an adversarial system, systemic biases, harm to children by the system and poor-quality
services. In their systematic review, Williamson et al. (2018) found that there were no
significant differences in outcomes associated with moral injury between military and
nonmilitary professions. In other words, combat exposure was not necessary in order for
individuals to experience moral injury. The studies involving veterinarians, journalists
and teachers were just as likely to experience moral injury as those in the military.
Therefore, while the majority of what is known about moral injury stems from the
military, research suggests this is only one occupation in which moral injury may occur.
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Further research is needed to examine the widespread application of moral injury beyond
the battlefield and whether all occupations experience moral injury universally.
One of the rationales for why moral injury is commonly researched in the military
is that violence is evident within the context of war and thus moral injury should be easier
to acknowledge and recognize. However, Neria and Pickover (2019) suggested that
although civilian workers may not experience morally injurious experiences to the same
degree as military personnel, betrayal and violence can occur in any human interaction at
work, and should be examined to understand the clinical applications to the general
working public. Other professions may not explicitly have violence and killing within
their job descriptions; however, many jobs involve aggressive behaviors. For example,
police officers, corrections officers, and the secret service all engage in behaviors with
protection, at whatever cost, of their workplace. These professions may be exposed to
situations where an employee must engage in physical violence that they do not
necessarily agree with, however, they may be held accountable, pulled from their
position, or hurt themselves if they do not act in a physical manner.
Previous Research on Morally Injurious Events
Past research has examined the impact that perceived betrayal and conflict cause
for individuals. The main outcomes of morally injurious experiences are guilt and shame
for participation in the event (Currier et al., 2018; Litz et al., 2009). Researchers have
described that guilt stems from internal conflict resulting from a misalignment of one’s
behavior and values, whereas shame is a social construct where behaviors are perceived
as violating others’ sense of right and wrong (Litz et al., 2009). Currier et al. (2018;

34

2015) and others have suggested that a central process for how morally injurious
experiences contribute to problems is through meaning making (Koenig et al., 2018).
When individuals cannot justify the rationale for their actions or those of others,
dysfunctional outcomes are more likely. Most commonly, and as a result of the
predominance in military samples, researchers have found strong associations between
morally injurious experiences and depression (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015; Currier,
Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Komarovskaya et al.,
2011), PTSD (Backholm & Idås, 2015; Barnes et al., 2019; Browne et al., 2012; Bryan et
al., 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Komarovskaya et al., 2011; McCormack & Riley,
2016; Ogle et al., 2018; Papazoglou et al., 2019; Worthen & Ahern, 2014). suicidal
idealization and attempts (Bryan et al., 2014; Bryan et al., 2013; Maguen et al., 2011;
Wisco et al., 2017).
Feelings of guilt and demoralization have had much stronger associations with
PTSD than combat exposure and abusive violence (Laufer et al., 1985). Henning and
Frueh (1997) found that guilt accounted for 30% of the unique variance in a composite of
reexperiencing and avoidance symptoms and 8% of the unique variance in overall PTSD
severity. In their meta-analysis, Williamson et al. (2018) found that within thirteen
studies conducted on moral injury, moral injurious experiences accounted for 9.4% of the
variance in PTSD, 5.2% of the variance in depression and 2.0% of the variance in
suicidality.
Moral injury can also affect trust between coworkers. Jinkerson (2016) stated that
betrayal of trust was one of the core symptoms of moral injury and that trust contributes
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to loss of trust in oneself, others, existential dread and demoralization (Koenig et al.,
2018; McCormack & Ell, 2017). Koenig et al. (2018) and Currier et al. (2018) also found
a moderate negative relationship between moral injury and social support, as assessed
through the perceived quality of relationships and involvement in community activities.
Further, McCormack and Riley (2016) found that all participants in their study (N=7)
disconnected from their family and friends to varying degrees to avoid the shame
associated with morally injurious events. Evidence has shown that shame has caused
military and police samples to resort to self-destructive behaviors such as substance abuse
(Currier et al., 2018; Maguen et al., 2011; McCormack & Riley, 2016; Tripp et al., 2016),
and social isolation (Currier et al., 2018; McCormack & Riley, 2016; Pasillas et al.,
2006). The association with morally injurious events causes military personnel to push
away their family and friends as a result of resentment to feeling misunderstood in their
experiences (Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Worthen &
Ahern, 2014). Others have also demonstrated the impact of moral injury on ruptured
social bonds (Currier et al., 2018; Nash & Litz, 2013). Specially, Nash and Litz (2013)
found a moderately strong negative correlation between exposure to potentially morally
injurious events and social support.
Bryan (2016) found that individuals expressed hopelessness, pessimism, and
emotional numbing due to increased moral injury. These emotions have been applied to
the workplace, where morally injurious experiences have been associated with
compassion fatigue (Papazoglou et al., 2019), burnout (Sugrue, 2020) and intentions to
leave one’s job (Sugrue, 2020). In two studies involving social workers and teachers,
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nearly a third of all professionals described themselves or colleagues as actively seeking
employment elsewhere (Haight et al., 2017; Sugrue, 2020). Evidence is mixed as to
whether exposure to morally injurious events is associated with aggressive behaviors at
work (Currier et al., 2018; Maguen et al., 2009; Worthen & Ahern, 2014). However,
evidence suggests that impulsive or counterproductive behaviors may occur as a result of
self-contempt in participating in a morally injurious event (Currier et al., 2018; Maguen
et al., 2009). In their study of veterans, Maguen et al. (2009) found that 13% of the
variance in functional impairment was predicted by killing noncombatants, even after
controlling for general war combat. Specifically, Haight et al. (2017) described in their
study a sample of CPS personnel who struggled to behave in an ethical and moral manner
within the system that they viewed as deeply flawed. Morally injurious experiences
should be a concern for organizations based on these outcomes.
Summary of Moral Injury
Prior research has demonstrated the adverse effects of individual wellbeing as a
result of morally injurious experiences. However, with the lack of knowledge coming
from the workplaces of the general public, research is limited in the implications to
organizationally relevant behavior. The implications of moral injury are clear as the
construct has been observed globally in samples from El Salvador (Currier, Holland,
Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015), Finland (Papazoglou et al., 2019), Britain (Browne et al.,
2012), Australia (McCormack & Riley, 2016), Norway (Backholm & Idås, 2015),
Portugal (Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016), and Israel (Levi-Belz et al., 2020).
However, research is needed within other domains, beyond the battlefield.
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Researchers have suggested that other professions are likely to experience guilt,
shame, and betrayal of trust as a result of morally injurious experiences in the workplace.
Understanding that moral values can conflict with work requirements and influence an
individual’s sense of self, others, and the world around them will allow researchers and
practitioners to understand employee reactions. As Litz et al. (2009) summarized, shame
is fundamentally experienced through the anticipated negative evaluation by others,
therefore, it is not surprising that individuals who feel ashamed being exposed to morally
injurious events have the desire to hide or withdraw.
Summary of Moral Suffering
The existence of moral suffering is evident. Researchers have attributed the
internal conflict of moral values of judgements and actions frequently to the military and
healthcare domains. Many researchers have debated the definitions and measurement of
moral distress and injury independently, however no research to date has acknowledged
the similar moral appraisal of situations as being in the same nomological network of
moral suffering (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; Sugrue, 2019). Both components involve
the cognitive and emotional processes that an individual experiences when a conflict
relates to a violation of moral expectations in the way matters should occur at work
(Jameton, 1984; Litz et al., 2009).
It is clear that both components of moral suffering involve the conflict between
one’s beliefs of the right course of action but are unable to influence the circumstance.
However, where moral distress is a result of individuals feeling ‘trapped’ by individual or
organizational constraints, moral injury involves trauma and atrocities that violate one’s
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beliefs of what actions are necessary (Jinkerson, 2016; Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017;
Sugrue, 2019). Additionally, while moral distress occurs from the feeling of being forced
to do something at work that one finds morally wrong, the result is a sense of
helplessness in the specific situation but one’s world view remains intact. An individual
feels guilt and shame from being pressured into decisions that are made and thus would
contribute to a negative evaluation of oneself. Whereas the resulting effect of
experiencing moral injury causes an individual to question their sense of a just world and
the other people in it. An individual perceives that harmful events occurred at work as a
result of themselves or others allowing harm to occur, and thus result in external negative
attributions.
Papazoglou and Chopko (2017) and Sugrue (2019) have begun to illustrate the
overarching construct of moral suffering in the helping professions, describing the
various situations where moral injury and moral distress uniquely occur. Some
occupations may be exposed to more of one component of moral suffering than another,
however researchers need a clear and consistent conceptualization of the constructs in
order to adequately address the implications. While some outcomes associated with moral
injury and distress may be similar, such as guilt and shame, other outcomes may be
unique as a result of the key differences between the constructs. Actions relating harm
and violence may resonate more in reexperiencing and rumination in the events resulting
in PTSD and counterproductive work behaviors, whereas situations that comprise of
morally wrong judgements may be associated more with outcomes such as hopelessness,
compassion fatigue and loss of meaningful work.
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The current study contends that moral suffering is the overarching term for moral
injury and distress using empirical support. Researchers have examined both constructs
but have failed to assess the unique influences each construct may have on outcomes of
interest (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; Sugrue, 2019). Additionally, researchers have
cross contaminated measures by including components of injury in distress measures and
distress in injury measures. For example, in Currier et al.’s (2015) measure of moral
injury, the authors state the questions cover five broad domains including “ethical and
moral conflicts” (p. 56). Additionally, in Lev and Ayalon’s (2018) measure of moral
distress, the researchers include numerous questions describing abuse and physical harm.
In order to understand whether workplace hinderances and trauma that transgresses
against one’s core beliefs are distinct underlying constructs, the current study examined
the unique variance that both constructs contribute to key outcomes.
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CHAPTER THREE: PERCEIVED OCCUPATIONAL STIGMA
People naturally categorize themselves and others into groups, as classifications
provide information about others, and contribute to an individual’s sense of belonging,
self-esteem and pride (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Individuals can classify themselves
through identification with their job, organization, or industry. Social Identity Theory
suggests that individuals develop an identity based on their group memberships that
contributes to an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ mindset (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). This mindset explains
various reactions and behaviors that individuals engage in, based on their perceived
social standing. The perception about one’s classification within a group can lead to
perceived occupational stigma. No mater whether outsiders of the group actually believe
in the stereotypes associated with the group, individuals who perceive negative
evaluations made by others may experience adverse effects on their wellbeing. The
current study assesses the relationship between perceived occupational stigma and
dysfunctional outcomes and investigates how perceived occupational stigma may
magnify the relationship between moral suffering and those outcomes.
Researchers have defined perceived occupational stigma as the perception that
outsiders of the organization perceive their work as physically, psychologically, or
morally tainted and of lesser value (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; E. C. Hughes, 1951;
1958). Individuals generally seek to maintain a positive image of the social groups to
which they belong (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1985), including their
occupation. As a result, individuals may engage in paranoid social cognition, where they
are hyperaware of their professions ‘status’ or the public’s stereotypes of their work and
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will seek to counter those stereotypes. Paranoid social cognition triggers hypervigilance
and rumination of social misperceptions and misjudgments and thus could lead to
enhanced negative outcomes for the individual (Kramer, 1998). This can be problematic
as individuals are challenged with maintaining their self-esteem while being associated
with the stigmatized occupational status (Bentein et al., 2017).
According to Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), when
individuals associate negative emotions with their work, these emotions can interfere
with an individual’s health and work behaviors. Research has demonstrated the impact
that stigma can have on depression (Benoit et al., 2015; Carlson et al., 2017; McCoy &
Major, 2003), emotional exhaustion (Bentein et al., 2017), maladjustment (Kamise,
2013), self-esteem (Boyce et al., 2007; McCoy & Major, 2003), engagement (Bentein et
al., 2017; Kamise, 2013), and occupational identification (Schaubroeck et al., 2018;
Shantz & Booth, 2014).
Researchers have also suggested that negative emotions held towards work may
increase the likelihood of withdrawal and counterproductive work behaviors (Boyce et
al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001; Schaubroeck et al., 2018; Shantz & Booth, 2014; Urick et al.,
2018). Counterproductive work behaviors are actions that employees engage in that are
harmful to organizational stakeholders and counter to organizational goals (Robinson &
Bennett, 1995). In one study comparing housekeepers (a stigmatized profession), to nonhousekeepers, the researchers found strong evidence linking the housekeeper’s
perceptions of stigma was associated with engaging in counterproductive work behaviors
(Urick et al., 2018). However, in contrast to previous authors who have suggested that
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negative emotions lead to engaging in counterproductive work behaviors (Fox et al.,
2001), Urick et al. (2018) found that their sample of housekeepers had ‘limited emotions’
(neither high nor low affect), which caused the housekeepers to emotionally disconnect
from their job duties and perform deviant behaviors. Interestingly, the authors suggested
that different stigmatized occupations may engage in different types of counterproductive
work behaviors based on the impact the actions have on the worker.
Alternatively, other researchers have found that individuals attempt to counteract
the ‘taint’ they perceive through developing occupational ideologies and social buffers
(Ashforth et al., 2007). Research has suggested that perceived occupational stigma leads
to negative outcomes because it causes the individual to question their self-views and
their relationship to the marginalized group (Shantz & Booth, 2014). Self-views are an
important process in how individuals understand their purpose in society and experience
meaningful work. When an employee has an increased sense of meaning in their work,
they can minimize the negative effects of perceived occupational stigma by rationalizing
what they do as having a purpose in society. Researchers have suggested that all workers
are capable of fostering a sense of meaning from work, regardless of their occupational
status (Bailey & Madden, 2017; Lips-Wiersma et al., 2016; Shim, 2016). However, the
sense of meaningfulness is typically described as occurring as ‘episodes’ rather than
general perceptions about work for stigmatized groups (Bailey & Madden, 2017;
Mercurio, 2020; Shim, 2016). This has important implications, as individuals may find
meaning in some of their work duties, some of the time, however, individuals may not
associate their work in general as being meaningful. These findings contribute to the
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various outcomes that are associated with perceived occupational stigma; individuals who
do not perceive meaning at a given time may be more likely to experience dysfunctional
outcomes. In a sample of custodial workers, Mercurio (2020) found that experiencing
meaninglessness at work amplified stigma's negative influence on perceptions of oneself
and the work that they do.
In addition to finding meaning in work tasks, social buffers have been reported as
coping mechanisms to counteract the taint associated with the stigma. Social buffers are a
form of a social network where an individual’s form a ‘clique’ of workers in their
profession that insulates the worker from the effects of the public’s view (Ashforth et al.,
2007). Individuals use this group as a form of validation of their work; gaining a sense
that they are not alone. Ashforth et al. (2007; 2014) suggested that this group membership
encourages individuals to rely more on fellow occupational members as sources of social
validation than other professions, as stigmatized workers are less able to receive support
outside of their occupation.
However, researchers have also noted a concern for individuals who lack the
social wall and occupational ideology that buffers the taint from affecting an individual.
Ashforth et al. (2007) stated that individuals who lack a social buffer “would likely find it
more difficult to maintain their occupational esteem…trigger[ing] various negative
individual and organizational outcomes” (p. 160). Therefore, troubling events that take
place at work, such as moral suffering, that cause an individual to feel ashamed or
betrayed by occupational group members, break down the meaning associated with one’s
work and the social buffer to which they rely on. This breakdown of coping mechanisms
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is likely to increase the risk of moral suffering to an individual’s wellbeing and contribute
to the likelihood of retaliation behaviors. The present study addressed the link between
moral suffering and perceived occupational stigma on outcomes with the belief that the
interaction between violations made at work and a heightened perception of stigma will
negatively affect an individual’s mental health, sense of meaningful work, and may lead
to adverse performance behaviors.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROPOSED HYPOTHESES
As previous researchers have suggested, knowledge is needed on the clarification
of moral injury and moral distress as being separate but related constructs. Past
researchers have used the terms interchangeably or inaccurately and assessed the
constructs inconsistently. While there is a general agreement that not every individual
will perceive moral suffering from an event, researchers have measured the constructs by
confounding the frequency of experiences with the intensity of emotional turmoil in
many measures of moral suffering. Additionally, the referent to which the moral event
results from, whether an individual is either a witness to someone else’s immoral actions
or a perpetrator in which they felt obligated to act in such a way, could shed light on the
way in which outcomes occur. The current study aimed to address the inconsistencies in
the assessment of outcomes and clarify the concept of moral suffering. Based on the
moral suffering measurement model, the factors that were extracted served as the
dimensions of moral suffering in subsequent analyses.
Further, with minimal research conducted on moral suffering in occupations other
than healthcare and the military, organizations may be unaware of the internal struggle
employees may be facing (Haight et al., 2017; Williamson et al., 2018). Many
professions and industries must abide by legal, professional, and organizational standards
in which morally threatening events can arise. As most participants in military research
are male, and the majority of participants within the healthcare domain are female,
understanding of the constructs may be limited by the gender representation within the
professions (Williamson et al., 2018). Therefore, the current study extends the moral
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suffering literature by studying a sample that is diverse, both with regard to gender and
occupation.
Additionally, a review of the literature demonstrated a need for an in-depth
examination of the construct of moral suffering without a reliance on cross-sectional
design inferences. Williamson and colleagues (2018) reported that within their metaanalytic review of the literature on moral injury, 12/13 articles were cross sectional. The
research investigating moral distress has followed a similar pattern (Ando & Kawano,
2018; Asgari et al., 2019; Elpern et al., 2005; Haghighinezhad et al., 2019). Past
researchers have also called for an assessment of other risk factors and instrumental
moderator variables that may affect mental health outcomes over time. Much of the
literature is limited to medical and war related outcomes, providing a gap in knowledge
of outcomes that may occur in the general workforce. While concepts such as PTSD and
turnover are relevant to the general workplace, other outcomes are needed to broaden the
understanding of moral suffering.
The present study documented the experience of moral injury and moral distress
in a broad range of occupations in the United States. Thus, the current study proposed
three goals; (a) Extend the literature on moral suffering to examine the frequency and
intensity of moral injury and distress in a wide range of professions; (b) Examine the
distinction between moral injury and moral distress, both conceptually and statistically,
and examine whether the constructs predict different outcomes uniquely; and (c)
Examine the role of occupational stigma, and the association of an individual to a
stigmatized occupation may magnify the effects of moral suffering.
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Through the Conservation of Resources Theory, the relationships of moral
suffering on outcomes can be theoretically explained. According to Conservation of
Resources Theory, individuals are motivated to preserve and maintain personal resources
(Hobfoll, 1989). Personal beliefs and values such as honesty, integrity, and ethics can be
considered personal resources and when those resources are threatened, distress can
occur. Research has supported the notion that moral suffering is associated with the loss
of personal and professional integrity (Carpenter, 2010; Hardingham, 2004; Kelly, 1998).
Further, in their conceptualization of moral residue, Webster and Baylis (2000) suggested
that with continuous violation of deeply held beliefs, values and principles, individuals
continue to experience distress even when the situation is no longer occurring. Moral
residue is an exemplar of conservation of resources theory’s loss spirals which contribute
to the continuous loss of resources and leads to further loss (Hobfoll, 1989).
Research has shown the impact that stress can have over time. If individuals are
continuously exposed to situations that make them question their belief system, this can
create uncertainty and fear in their global perceptions of the world. The shame and guilt
associated with moral suffering can affect perceptions of oneself and the emotional
processing of the event (Kruger, 2014). Challenging one’s belief system and a perceived
inability to overcome the obstacle can lead depression and anxiety. Research has
continuously investigated the symptoms of moral injury and moral distress on depression
and anxiety (e.g., Colville et al., 2019; Dombo et al., 2013; Lamiani et al., 2018; Litz et
al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2016), however, no study has examined the unique variance that
moral distress and injury that may contribute to the onset of mental health symptoms.
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Mental health has been the main area of concern in the moral suffering literature, so to
uncover whether the constructs are examining unique features of the work environment,
the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1(a-b): Moral suffering assessed at Time 1 will be associated with increased
mental health symptoms at Time 2; Both (a) Moral injury and (b) moral distress
will predict unique variance in mental health symptoms.
Kopacz et al. (2019) described moral suffering as the “psychological wound” as a
result of meaning making from stressful events. Research has examined the difficulties in
meaning making as a mediator of how events increase the risk of psychological
symptoms (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015; Kopacz et al., 2019). Individuals construct
meaning through interpretation of events in ways that are congruent with ones preexisting beliefs, when those events conflict, an individual takes on responsibility or blame
for the event (Kopacz et al., 2019). Thus, when employees observe actions or decision
making that appears to contradict with the purpose they believed in, an employee can lose
their sense of meaning in work. Moral distress can uniquely impact the meaning an
individual derives from work as an individual who is drawn to a certain profession may
experience circumstances where they are prohibited from achieving that goal. Similarly,
moral injury is a result of exposure to violence and harm, which can alter beliefs about a
just world which causes a “breakdown in global meaning” (Currier, Holland, & Malott,
2015). While moral distress may cause an individual to experience a decrease in
meaningful work due to restriction in the ability to serve their ‘purpose’, moral injury
exposes individuals to violence that leads to questioning own’s confidence and
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expectations about their own’s and other’s actions (Dombo et al., 2013). Thus, the
following hypotheses are proposed:
H2(a-b): Moral suffering assessed at Time 1 will be associated with decreased
meaningful work at Time 2; Both (a) Moral injury and (b) moral distress will
predict unique variance in meaningful work.
Additionally, organizational justice research has shown that when individuals
disagree with work processes or believe that decisions made were unfair, the individual
can react by ‘getting even’ with the organization by engaging in counterproductive work
behaviors (CWB; Ahmed & Khan, 2016). Individuals perceiving that judgements or
decisions are against what is right, may interpret the event as unfair. Antecedents of
counterproductive work behaviors are similar to the outcomes associated with morally
distressing events; individuals who feel violated by decisions decrease the trust
relationship between the individual and the organization and decreases their sense of
control. Research suggests that individuals who feel disrespected, not heard, or
undervalued are more likely to retaliate. Behaviors such as coming in late, misusing
resources, and being disobedient can signal that the employee is not satisfied with the
way work is currently conducted (Dalal, 2005). The disruption of perceived morality in
events can cause individuals to question their confidence in the system and diminishes
“their capacity or behave in a just and ethical manner” (Drescher et al., 2011, p. 9).
Research has begun to investigate the extent to which those suffering from PTSD
may resort to unethical behavior (Blumberg et al., 2018; LaMotte & Murphy, 2017).
Prior work provides justification as research has suggested moral injury as a precursor to
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PTSD. One of the few distinctions between morally distressing and injurious experiences
is that moral injury seems to capture the sense of betrayal by others at work. Feelings of
betrayal encourage individuals to engage in CWBs in sabotage, theft, or aggressive
behavior (Fisher & Baron, 1982; Greenberg, 1990; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Morally
injurious experiences may evoke stronger feelings of anger and betrayal to retaliate
against individuals within the organization and engage in CWBs. Thus, the following
hypotheses are proposed:
H3(a-b): Moral suffering assessed at Time 1 will be associated with increased
counterproductive work behaviors at Time 2; Both (a) Moral injury and (b) moral
distress will predict unique variance in counterproductive work behaviors.
While many professions are exposed to morally questionable events, some
professions may be more at risk for suffering than others. Researchers have suggested
that shame is intensified when an individual experiences moral suffering and it may be
due to the social standing of one’s job role. While guilt causes an individual to question
the justification of an event, shame encourages an individual to escape and hide due to
social norms (Kubany & Manke, 1995). Researchers have suggested that individuals who
perceive they work in stigmatized occupations are often negatively impacted by the
perceptions of society (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Kreiner et al., 2006). Individuals who
perceive they work in stigmatized occupations may experience worse outcomes of moral
suffering than other occupations.
Researchers have demonstrated that individuals who perceive they work in a
stigmatized occupation are often concerned with their relationships with outsiders
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(Bolton, 2005; Ghidina, 1992; Tracy, 2004). Social Identity Theory (Abrams & Hogg,
1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1985) and research on paranoid social cognition suggest that
individuals are aware of their categorization within society (e.g., their profession or
industry) and perceived stigma associated with that categorization can lead individuals to
have increased sensitivity to how they are evaluated by others (Dutton et al., 1996;
Kramer, 1998). Haug (2018) found that the public perception and pressures surrounding
student affairs personnel increased their moral distress. Additionally, Mak and Cheung
(2012) found that caregivers of individuals with mental illness who had a strong face
concern (the desire to preserve social image and social worth associated with one’s job
role) internalized the perceived stigma, which increased psychological distress and
subjective burden. In addition, Litz et al. (2009) stated that individuals who experience
moral suffering may be more reluctant to utilize social supports, and it is possible that
they may be actually shunned in light of the moral violation.
When employees experience paranoid social cognition and simultaneously feel
they have been wronged by someone inside the organization, they may not feel that there
is anyone they can turn to for support. Employees who do not believe in the decisions and
actions made by themselves (or others) in their organization as being morally ‘right’ may
feel as though they are less able to express their concerns to friends and family in fear of
worsening outsiders’ perceptions of their occupation. For example, a police officer who is
hyperaware of the public’s perception of racial issues, may be less likely to confide in
outsiders about perceived moral conflicts they experienced at work, in order to avoid
confirming the stereotype. With no felt social support and questioning the beliefs of their
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own work, the experience of moral suffering while working in a stigmatized occupation
can deeply affect mental wellbeing.
Previous research has identified the changes in emotions, relationships, and
personal identity of morally injured participants as a result of perceived or actual
rejection by family or friends leading to increased psychological and social problems
(Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Purcell et al., 2016;
Vargas et al., 2013; Worthen & Ahern, 2014). Researchers have found that military
members felt resentment due to feeling misunderstood by civilians based on their job
duties and this resentment led to increased moral suffering (Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira,
2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Nash & Litz, 2013). Participants reported the inability
to express themselves and their experiences to outsiders who would not understand the
requirements of war (Drescher et al., 2011; McCormack & Ell, 2017). One participant
reported “civility is meaningless” in war and outsiders would not comprehend their
cognitive and emotional states during the events that occurred (McCormack & Ell, 2017,
p. 17). Other military participants believed they had to remain silent about their
experiences to maintain healthy relationships in society (McCormack & Ell, 2017;
Purcell et al., 2016). Similar results have been found within the healthcare field, where
healthcare providers cited alienation from fellow providers and occupational networks
after exposure to work-related morally injurious experiences (Gibbons et al., 2013;
Haight et al., 2017).
Litz et al. (2009) stated that the intensity of moral suffering may depend on
outsiders’ reactions and opinions on those events which can explain differences in
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experiences outcomes. The interaction of occupational stigma from one’s job duties and
the perceived moral transgressions that occur at work can lead individuals to resort to
self-destructive behaviors such as alcohol abuse, social isolation, and disconnecting from
others (McCormack & Riley, 2016). These behaviors may be a consequence of
individuals questioning the purpose of their work as a result of the moral transgression
and allowing the stigma surrounding one’s work to harm their identity (Roca, 2010).
Therefore, perceived occupational stigma may magnify the effects of moral suffering on
the proposed outcomes. Thus, the following hypotheses are presented:
H4-6: High levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time 1 will moderate the
relationships between moral suffering at Time 1 and (4) mental health symptoms,
(5) meaningful work, and (6) counterproductive work behaviors assessed at Time
2; the relationship between moral suffering and the outcomes will be stronger for
those who report feeling stigma from their work.
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHOD
Participants and Procedure
In order to assess complex structural equation models (SEM), large sample sizes
are needed to test the proposed relationships. Barret (2007) and Kline (2005) have
suggested a sample of 200 as a minimum for complex structural models. Additionally,
with the aim of establishing the presence of moral suffering within a variety of
workplaces, participants were recruited through an online data collection service,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk; see Huff & Tingley, 2015). Mturk is an established
survey software providing valid and reliable measurement methods (Buhrmester et al.,
2011; Pittman & Sheehan, 2016). Researchers have stated that Mturk is a representative
sample of occupations in the US for occupational health research (Michel, 2018).
Participants were eligible to participate in the study if they were a United States
Citizen, 18 years old, and work at least 30 hours per week (at a job other than Mturk). A
total of 699 participants responded to the Time 1 survey, and after the completion of the
initial survey, participants were asked to participate in a follow up survey 3 months later.
479 participants responded at Time 2 resulting in the final matched sample used in the
analyses (69% response rate). Participants received compensation for completing the
survey and passing all necessary attention checks.
On average, participants were 41 years old (SD = 10.98), ranging from 20 years
old to 71 years old. The gender of the participants was evenly split with 51% of
participants identified themselves as male, 48% identified female, and .5% identified as
nonbinary or transgender. The majority of participants were white (76%), followed by
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Asian (9%), Black or African American (7%), Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin (6%),
and Other (2%). Most participants had earned a Bachelors degree (43%), followed by
18% of participants holding a Masters degree, 12% Associates Degree, 12% had some
college, 7% had a high school degree, 5% had a Doctoral Degree, and 2% had some
graduate school experience.
On average, participants worked at their current job for 8 years (SD = 7.28); with
63% of participants reported working 30-40 hours a week and 37% reported working
more than 40 hours a week. Participants were asked “On average, how many people
(management, coworkers, employees, customers) do you interact with on a daily basis at
work?” Most participants worked with 1-10 individuals on a daily basis (40%), with 30%
working with 11-20 other individuals, 9% worked with 21-30 people on a regular basis
and 15% worked with more than 30 people. Only 6% of participants reported most often
working alone. Participants reported working in a variety of industries, with the most
common industries being Educational Services (16%), Professional, Scientific, and
Technical Services (15%), Finance and Insurance (11%), Health Care and Social
Assistance (11%). The majority of participants earned a yearly salary (58%) while 42%
earned an hourly wage. Most participants earned $25,000-$49,000 (33%), followed by
29% earning $50,000-$74,000, 19% earning $75,000-$99,000, 8% earning less than
$25,000, and 10% earning over $100,000 in yearly salary.
In order to test for response bias of differences between participants who
responded to both time points in comparison to participants who only responded at Time
1, independent samples t-tests and chi-square tests were computed. There were no

56

significant differences between the two groups in terms of gender, ꭓ2 (3) = 0.83, n.s.,
income, ꭓ2 (5) = 10.48, n.s., salary/hourly employment, ꭓ2 (1) = .033, n.s., and education, ꭓ2
(7) = 10.39, n.s. However, there were significant differences between the groups in ethnicity,
ꭓ2 (5) = 18.52, p < .01, the frequency of white participants whom responded to both Time
periods increased from 67% at Time 1 to 76% at Time 2, while participants who identified as
Black or African American decreased from Time 1 (16%) to Time 2 (7%). Participants who
responded to both Time periods were also older (M = 40.6, SD = 11.00) compared to those
who only responded to Time 1 (M = 38.0, SD = 10.50), t (700) = 94.85, p < .01.
Additionally, participants who responded to both time periods worked at their current
position longer (M = 7.71, SD = 7.28) compared to those who only responded to Time 1 (M
= 6.17, SD = 5.75), t (704) = 25.10, p < .01.
Additional analyses were conducted on the key measures utilized in the study. There
were no significant differences between the groups in terms of meaningful work, t (472) =
1.63, n.s. However, there were significant differences between the two groups in the
frequency (t (319) = 4.09, p < .01) and the experience (t (396) = 2.38, p < .05) of moral
suffering, where participants who responded to only the first survey had higher frequency of
exposure (M = 2.24, SD = 1.51) and experienced more moral suffering (M = 2.60, SD = 1.72)
than participants who responded to both time periods (M = 1.78, SD = 1.05; M = 2.28, SD =
1.59, respectively). Additionally, participants who responded to both time points experienced
less perceived occupational stigma (M = 2.41, SD = 1.64) than those who responded to Time
1 (M = 2.92, SD = 1.92), t (373) = 3.46, p < .05.. Participants who responded to both time
periods also had slightly less mental health symptoms, t (382) = 3.38, p < .05 (M = 1.66, SD
= 0.83) and committed less counterproductive work behaviors, t (266) = 5.61, p < .05, (M =
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1.25, SD = 0.69) than those who responded only to the first survey (M = 1.91, SD = 0.95; M
= 1.83, SD = 1.44, respectively). Overall, while the differences were statistically significant,
the mean differences and effect sizes were relatively small, suggesting that the differences
will not contribute to problematic patterns of attrition.

Measures
All study measures were collected at both time periods. The complete list of
measures, instructions, and their respective items can be found in Appendices A-F. The
Time 1 survey included demographic variables such as age, race, gender, industry,
professional title, and tenure. Moral suffering was assessed through four scales targeting
moral suffering frequency (frequency of morally injurious experiences and morally
distressing events) and moral suffering intensity (perceived moral injury and moral
distress; Glasberg et al., 2006; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Lev & Ayalon, 2018).
Morally Injurious Experiences. The frequency of exposure to morally injurious
experiences was assessed using a modified version of the Morally Injurious Experiences
Scale (Currier, Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015). The original scale was intended for a
sample of teachers in El-Salvador with references to educational leaders, students, and
teaching personnel, thus the scale was adapted to refer to management, coworkers, and
people at work. Additionally, the original 12 item scale was contaminated with 4 items
referring to feelings associated with an event and thus all emotional components were
removed from the scale to ensure only the frequency of morally injurious events was
captured in this section. The items were “things I saw/experienced things that left me
feeling betrayed or let-down by educational leaders” (item 1), “I feel guilt over failing to
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protect a student” (item 3), “I feel guilt for being able to return to safety at the end of the
work day when many students cannot” (item 5) and “I felt betrayed or let-down by my
colleagues” (item 7). The four items were modified to remove the emotional component
and rephrased to focus on the event, such as “I saw a coworker engage in actions that I
did not agree with” (modified item 7). Two items referred to the emotional outcomes of
moral injury and thus were removed from the questionnaire as they did not specifically
reference a situation that has the potential to cause moral injury (“Seeing people suffer in
the workplace has changed me” (item 9) and “I came to realize that I am no longer
affected by violence I have seen at work” (item 11)). See Appendix A for the original and
modified versions of the scale.
Participants were instructed to select the choice that indicates how often they have
experienced each of the situations over the past 3 months. The instructions also clarified
referents as being ‘anyone you are in contact with at work’ as moral injurious events can
involve oneself, coworkers, management, or clients/patients/customers. Participants
responded to 10 items, 5 referring to witness-based events (e.g., “I have seen someone
unnecessarily harmed at work”) and 5 items referring to perpetration-based events (e.g.,
“I failed to take action in helping someone at work”). The items were assessed with a 6point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never, have no experience) to 6 (always, everyday).
Internal consistency was not calculated in the initial study, as the authors stated that the
measure contained reflective items (Currier, Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015).
However, the authors provided evidence that the measure contained face validity and
construct validity through its correlation with related constructs such PTSD and Burnout.
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Morally Distressing Events. The frequency of exposure to morally distressing
events was assessed with adapted versions of two Moral Distress Questionnaires
(Eizenberg et al., 2009; Lev & Ayalon, 2018). Similar to the morally injurious
experiences measure, this scale was intended to assess only the frequency of events. Two
scales were combined in order to ensure that both perpetration-based and witness-based
morally distressing events were included. The Eizenberg et al. (2009) measure contained
only perpetration-based items and thus witness-based morally distressing events from the
Lev and Ayalon (2018) measure were added. Additionally, the two scales were modified
for the present study for a few reasons. First, the original measures were tailed to
healthcare or social work practices, so the referents were adjusted to apply more broadly
modifying original items from residents, patients, physicians, and institution to
management, coworkers, and people at work. Secondly, Eizenberg et al.’s (2009) original
measure was cross contaminated with other related constructs, such as role conflict, role
overload, and role ambiguity (e.g., item 6, “I was forced to provide an incomplete
treatment to the patient owing to work overload”) as a result, 5 items were removed from
the adapted measure. Additionally, one item was specific to the healthcare industry and
would not be generalizable to a wide variety of occupations (item 12, “I was forced to
ignore the clients/customer/ patient’s family questions because my supervisor the
physician was supposed to address them”) and thus was cut from the adapted measure.
After the removal of these items, 5 items were retained from the Eizenberg et al. (2009)
measure.
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In addition to the items from Eizenberg et al. (2009), 5 items were taken from the
Lev and Ayalon (2018) measure to supplement the missing ‘witness’ component from the
previous measure. However, 4 out of the 5 items contained emotional referents (e.g., item
6, “There were situations in which I felt that the interest of the institution’s management
was in contradiction with the interest of the residents”), thus, feelings were adapted to
reflect on the actual situation that occurred (e.g., “There have been situations where I
believed management's interests were in contradiction with the purpose of my work”).
See Appendix A for the original scale and modified measure.
Participants were instructed to select the choice that indicates how often they have
experienced each of the situations over the past 3 months. The instructions also clarified
referents as being ‘anyone you are in contact with at work’ as moral injurious events can
involve oneself, coworkers, management, or clients/patients/customers. Participants
responded to 10 items, with 4 items referring to the witness-based events such as, “I have
been forced to do my job according to my organization’s protocols, which were against
my professional opinion” and 6 items referred to the perpetration-based events such as, “I
have seen a college behavior in an inappropriate way at work that I did not have the
ability to prevent.” All items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never,
have no experience) to 6 (always, everyday). Eizenberg et al.’s (2009) original measure
demonstrated test-retest reliability and had an internal consistency of .81 for the full
measure in the initial study. Both scales established content validity through qualitative
data (focus groups and interviews) and expert review and evaluation of the measures.

61

Moral Suffering Intensity. As previous authors have suggested, moral suffering
is an appraisal-based construct in which many situations have the potential to cause the
psychological and emotional response to occur, but it is an individual’s appraisal of the
event as being against their belief of what is right that causes moral suffering. In order to
assess the degree to which a reaction occurred, each morally injurious and morally
distressing event was followed by “to what extent did this situation upset you?” The item
was based off the troubled conscience item from the Stress of Conscience Questionnaire
(Glasberg et al., 2006). The original scale utilized a similar format to the current study, as
each question involved a two-part response where participants reported (A) how often a
stressful event occurred and then responded to (B) “to what extent did this situation give
you a troubled conscience?” Responses ranged from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). The
original measure was pilot tested on two samples (faculty and healthcare workers), had
high test-retest reliability and internal consistency when included in the overall scale and
thus provided rationale for indexing the intensity from the single item.
Mental Health Symptoms. Participants indicated their current mental health
symptoms by responding to a combined measure of the Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Scale (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006) and the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ; Spitzer
et al., 1999). Participants were instructed to reflect on the past 3 months and report how
often they were bothered by 7 items referring to anxiety symptoms such as, “not being
able to stop or control worrying” and 9 items referring to depressive symptoms such as,
“feeling down, depressed, or hopeless.” Participants responded to the items using a 4point response scale ranging from (1) not at all to (4) nearly every day. Prior authors have
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demonstrated the reliability and validity of the measures though test-retest reliability and
reporting an internal consistency of .92 for GAD-7 and .86 for the PHQ in the original
studies (Spitzer et al., 1999; 2006). The original authors established criterion validity
through strong agreement with mental health professional diagnoses and construct
validity by measuring the association of both measures to self-reported disability days,
clinic visits, and the general amount of difficulty patients attribute to their symptoms
(Spitzer et al., 1999; 2006). Additionally, the GAD-7 had convergent validity with two
other anxiety scales: The Beck Anxiety Inventory and the anxiety subscale of the
Symptom Checklist-90 (Spitzer et al., 2006).
Meaningful Work. To assess meaningful work, the Work and Meaning Inventory
(Steger et al., 2012) was used. The original scale was derived from the multidimensional
model of work as a subjectively meaningful experience consisting of experiencing
positive meaning in work, sensing that work is a key avenue for making meaning, and
perceiving one’s work to benefit some greater good (Steger et al., 2012). Participants
were instructed to respond to 10 items, referring to positive meaning (“I understand how
my work contributes to my life’s meaning”), meaning making (“I view my work as
contributing to my personal growth”) and greater good motivations (“My work helps me
make sense of the world around me”). Participants responded to the items on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (absolutely untrue) to 5 (absolutely true). The authors
reported high reliability for the scale in the original study, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93
(Steger et al., 2012). The authors established convergent validity through high
correlations with other meaningful work measures such as the Brief Calling Scale (Dik et
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al., 2012) and Work Orientation scale (Wrzesniewski, 1999). The scale was also shown
to have high criterion validity as it was positively related to desirable work variables
(e.g., organizational citizenship behaviors, organizational commitment, job satisfaction)
and negatively related to undesirable work variables (e.g., days reported absent,
withdrawal intentions).
Perceived Occupational Stigma. In order to assess how individuals perceive
outsiders’ perception of their work, participants responded to the Occupational Stigma
Perception Questionnaire (Schaubroeck et al., 2018). Participants were instructed to
consider the extent that the items applied to their job in general. Participants responded to
5 items such as, “Most people would not want to associate themselves with a job like
mine” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The original study
cited a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 establishing good reliability of the scale (Schaubroeck et
al., 2018). The authors offered evidence of convergent validity of the scale in relation to
constructs such as occupational disidentification, withdrawal behavior and occupational
prestige.
Counterproductive Work Behaviors. Participants reported the frequency that they
engaged in counterproductive work behaviors with the Workplace Deviance Scale
(Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The scale reflects both interpersonal deviance and
organizationally directed deviance. Participants were instructed to reflect on the previous
3 months and report the frequency they engaged 19 items such as “Taken property from
work without permission” (organizational deviance) and “played a mean prank on
someone at work” (interpersonal deviance). Participants responded to the items using a 6-
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point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never, have no experience) to 6 (always, everyday).
Internal consistency was .81 for the organizationally deviance scale and .78 for the
interpersonal deviance scale in the original study (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The
authors established convergent validity with production and property deviance (Hollinger
& Clark, 1982) and withdrawal behaviors (Lehman & Simpson, 1992). The authors also
provided evidence of discriminant validity with measures such as voice and loyalty
(Farrell & Rusbult, 1986).
Attention Check. In order to ensure participants were paying attention and
providing high quality data, there was one attention check item included in each survey.
The item was embedded within a scale chosen at random, such as “please select agree for
this item.” If a participant answered the item incorrectly, the participant was warned and
then had to start the survey from the beginning. A second failure of the attention check
item excluded them from participation, and they did not receive pay for their survey
responses. This attention check system was outlined in the initial page of the survey
within the informed consent page so that participants were aware.
Analytical Plan
The proposed analyses were conducted in R Studio using the lavaan (Rosseel,
2012), dplyr (Wickham, 2020), and semPlot (Epskamp, 2015) packages. Descriptive
analyses were first conducted assessing the quality of item characteristics. The means,
standard deviations and Cronbach’s alpha for each measurement scale have been reported
in Table 6.
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As multiple measures were adapted and modified, the appropriate validation
strategies were conducted to establish the measurement model components before testing
the direct hypotheses. First, in order to assess the measurement structure of moral
suffering, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted on one half of the
sample, using the moral injury and moral distress items as indicators for the latent
constructs. The frequency items were not included into the initial factor analyses as they
are formative measures, and thus an observed score is used in the hypothesized models.
Following the suggested model factors from the EFA, the items were included in a
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) using robust maximum likelihood estimation (ML)
and the second half of the sample. The CFA was conducted with an emphasis on the
distinction between (1) moral injury and moral distress and (2) perpetration-based verses
witness-based moral suffering. Previous work has assessed the differences in these
distinctions and the current study will provide additional support for the validity for each
distinction. If the model fit was improved (χ2 p > .05, RMSEA < .08, CFI ≥ .90, and
SRMR < .08) when accounting for a given distinction, then the subscales were treated as
different measures through the remainder of the study (Kline, 2005).
In order to provide a comprehensive measure of moral suffering, a product score
that accounted for both the frequency and the intensity of each moral suffering
experience was also calculated. The measurement model of the product scores will also
be assessed. Given the need for clarification of the measurement model of moral
suffering, the measurement components of the analyses, item loading characteristics, and
fit indices of each measurement model were reported. Following the assessment of the

66

moral suffering model indices, a second CFA was conducted on all study variables to
demonstrate the uniqueness of each scale. Model fit indices were also specified.
In order to assess the relationship between constructs, the regression estimates
between moral suffering distinctions and mental health symptoms (H1), meaningful work
(H2), and counterproductive work behaviors (H3) were analyzed with a structural
equation model (SEM; see Figure 2). SEM allows multiple measurement models to be
compared with the paths among the variables estimated and adjusted as necessary.
Similar to the CFA analyses, all items were indicators of the latent variables (except the
frequency scores). For each hypothesis, a model that regressed the moral suffering
components on the outcomes was compared to a second model that constrained the path
between each component on the outcomes. Constraining the parameters to be equal
forced the model to make both moral suffering dimensions have equal loadings on the
outcomes and determined whether the variables contributed equally to the outcomes.
Thus, the study’s proposition that moral injury and moral distress are unique constructs
will be supported if the model that allows the paths to be freely estimated has improved
model fit. Further, the semipartial correlation (sr2) of each relationship was be assessed.
The sr2 removes the effect of one IV relative to another without removing the relationship
to Y, therefore demonstrating the unique contribution of moral distress and moral injury
on the dependent variables.
Next, perceived occupational stigma was examined as a moderator between the
relationships of moral suffering and outcomes (H4-6). Age and tenure were used as
control variables. Past research has suggested that novice workers (due to age and
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experience) in a profession that is typically associated with a stigma increases the
likelihood of negative outcomes due to new employees lacking the experience of coping
with the stereotypes associated with work (Ghidina, 1992). Thus, the proposed analyses
were assessed first without the control variables and compared to a second model with
the control variables.
To examine perceived occupational stigma as a moderator of the proposed
relationships, the interaction terms were calculated by the double-mean centering
approach (Lin et al., 2010). Researchers have stated that the double-mean centering
approach is superior to estimating latent interaction effects over other methods, especially
when normality assumptions have been violated (Lin et al., 2010). For each latent
predictor variable, the indicators were ranked in terms of their relative factor loading, and
then were mean centered. Next, the indicator item with the highest factor loading for the
moral suffering latent variable was multiplied by the indicator item with the highest
factor loading for the perceived occupational stigma latent variable. Each indicator item
of the moral suffering dimension was multiplied by the corresponding indictor item of the
perceived occupational stigma variable, resulting in 5 product terms. The product items
were mean centered again. The SEM interaction model contained the main effects,
control variables and interaction terms (see Figures 3-5). The model fit indices for the
causal model were examined and reported (χ2 p > .05, RMSEA < .08, CFI ≥ .90, and
SRMR < .08). If the specific interactions between moral suffering and perceived stigma
were significant, tests of simple slopes between moral suffering and the outcomes were
conducted at low (-1 SD), medium (M), and high levels of stigma (+1 SD).
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS
Prevalence of Moral Suffering
In order to understand how often participants were exposed to events that had the
potential to cause moral suffering, a preliminary analysis examined the rate of
endorsement for each item (N = 699). The items were recoded as (0) never experienced or
(1) experienced at least once over the course of the three months (see Table 1). The top
three most frequently experienced events were “I saw a coworker engage in actions that I
did not agree with (MI7; 74%)”, “I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the
best interests of our clients/patients/customers (MD7; 61%)”, and “I have seen a
colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did not have the ability to prevent
(MD9; 55%). Interestingly, the top three situations that caused the most moral suffering
was also MI7 (71%), MD7 (60%), and MD9(53%). No items were reported as ‘never
experienced’ by all participants. Overall, about half of the participants had experienced
each moral suffering item at least once over the past three months.
Moral suffering was also examined at the industry level. Due to small sample
sizes (N < 10), wholesale trade, real estate, agriculture, utilities, mining/oil, and gas
extraction, self-employed, and those who reported other services were excluded from this
preliminary analysis. All industries reported experiencing moral suffering to some
degree. Thirteen out of the eighteen industries reported experiencing moral suffering
regularly at work; where 7.4% of administrative and support services, 5.6% of finance
and insurance, 5.4% of manufacturing, 5.3% of government, 4% of accommodation and
food services, 4% of education services, 2% of healthcare and 1.4% of
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professional/scientific participants reported experiencing moral suffering “every week” or
“everyday”. The industries that had over half of their participants endorse experiencing
moral suffering (more often than not) were construction (75%), other (73%),
administration and support services (56%), finance and insurance (52%) and education
services (50%).
Moral Suffering Measurement Model
Descriptive analyses indicated that the multivariate normality assumptions (e.g.,
skewness, kurtosis) were violated by all study variables, meaning that overall,
participants tended to respond on the extreme ends of the response scale. For example,
many individuals reported that they had never or rarely experienced the moral suffering
items, or rarely engaged in counterproductive work behaviors. This finding is not
surprising, as the variables assessed in this study are not expected to occur for every
individual to a high degree. While multivariate nonnormality can influence the outcomes
of statistical analyses, researchers have provided strategies to incorporate in SEM
analyses to overcome influences of skewness.
Fabrigar (1998) recommended using principal axis factor methods when
conducting EFA and CFA when multivariate normality is ‘severely violated’. When data
are more frequently occurring along one part of the measurement scale, the skew can
affect the variance-covariance among variables. As a result, researchers suggest using
maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors and a mean-adjusted chisquare test statistic that are robust to non-normality (“MLM”; Hu, Bentler, & Kano,
1992; Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). The chi-square test statistic is also referred to as the
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Satorra-Bentler chi-square (Satorra & Bentler 1988; 1994). Adjustments are made to the
chi-square, relative fit indices, and standard errors based on a weight matrix derived from
an estimate of multivariate kurtosis.
In order assess the measurement model of moral suffering, the dataset was split
into two random halves (N=349), using one half to develop the model (EFA) and the
other half to validate the solution (CFA; Anderson & Gerbing, 1988, p. 421). First, all
moral suffering intensity indicator items were entered in the EFA model. The parallel
analysis suggested that the items loaded on an estimated 3 factors. In order to be
thorough, the EFA was conducted three times, extracting 2, 3, and 4 factors from the
model in order to compare which best fit the data. Upon inspection of the 2-factor
loadings, the factors seemed to represent witness-based moral suffering and perpetrationbased moral suffering, with no items cross-loading onto both factors.
The 3-factor model replicated the 2-factor witness – perpetration distinction, with
the items that loaded on a third factor representing safety-related items such as
experiences involving witnessing harm induced by a coworker or the inability to act and
protect someone. However, the safety variable included both witness- and perpetrationbased items. The 3-factor model included 5 items with cross-loadings on two factors. The
4-factor model reproduced the same findings from the 3-factor model except two items
loaded on their own final fourth factor and included a total of 4-items cross loading on
two factors. Comparing the models in terms of theoretically sound factors, minimal cross
loadings, and parsimony, the 2-factor model was deemed most appropriate. The 2-factor
model contained two items (MI2 and MI4) that loaded onto the ‘incorrect’ factor, as both

71

items were worded as witnessing an event (“I have seen…”) but loaded onto the
perpetration-based factor, conflicting with the remainder of the other items in the factor
(see Table 2 for factor loadings). Therefore, these two items were removed from the next
step of the validation model.
Following the suggested model factor structure from the EFA, the moral suffering
items were included in a series of Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) using the second
half of the split dataset (N =349). The initial CFA assessing the 2-factor structure
revealed adequate fit with the data (χ2 (134) = 373.428, p < .05, RMSEA = .088, TLI =
.894, CFI = .907, and SRMR = .055). However, after examining the factor loadings, it
appeared that two items had low loadings compared to the other items in the scale. The
items were “I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe when I
know others at work cannot (MI5; ꞵ = .53)” and “I failed to take action in helping
someone at work (MI6; ꞵ = .55). After removing these two items, the model fit indices
improved, (χ2 (103) = 279.174, p < .05, RMSEA = .086, TLI = .913, CFI = .926, and
SRMR = .051).
Next, a Lagrange-Multiplier test (LM test) was conducted to suggest potential
modifications to the measurement structure. The test provided a logical suggestion to add
a residual covariance between MI9 (“I have seen people at work suffer because of actions
involving other employees at my organization”) and MI10 (“I saw mistakes made by my
coworkers or other employees that led to other people suffering at work”). Both items
referred to seeing people at work suffer due to other employees, and thus adding this
modification was deemed a logical improvement to the model. The residual covariance
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was added to the model and improved the overall model χ2 by 37.21, (χ2 (102) = 256.38,
p < .05, RMSEA = .081, TLI = .924, CFI = .935, and SRMR = .049). The LM test
suggested adding another residual covariance between MI7 (“I saw a coworker engage in
actions that I did not agree with”) and MD9 (“I have seen a colleague behave in an
inappropriate way…”). Both items refer to disagreeing with coworker actions and was
deemed appropriate. After adding the covariance between the two items, the model fit
improved by ꭓ2 = 29.80, (χ2 (101) = 236.134, p < .05, RMSEA = .076, TLI = .933, CFI =
.943, and SRMR = .048).
Following this modification, the LM test did not provide compelling rationale to
add any other covariances. Within the final moral suffering model, the item loadings
ranged from .62 to .86 (see Table 3). One of the primary research questions in the current
study was to assess whether moral injury and moral distress are separate distinct
constructs under the same second-order factor of moral suffering. The measurement
model suggested that moral injury and moral distress do not appear to be distinct
constructs in the present study. Instead, another two-factor structure was found,
witnessing an event that causes moral suffering or perpetrating the event oneself. The
remainder of the hypotheses assessed the proposed relationships using this updated 2factor model.
Moral Suffering as a Product Score
In addition to examining the frequency and intensity of moral suffering, a product
score of the two variables was created in order to provide a comprehensive measure of
the moral suffering experience. Following the work of Corley (1995), the moral suffering
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frequency items were multiplied by their corresponding intensity (B) item and again
assessed for their model fit. The same 2-factor structure was used as stated previously,
resulting in adequate model fit, (χ2 (103) = 230.883, p < .05, RMSEA = .092, TLI = .925,
CFI = .935, and SRMR = .044). Similar to the main model, the LM test suggested adding
a residual covariance between MI9 and MI10 improving the model fit by χ2 = 61.53 (χ2
(102) = 208.332, p < .05, RMSEA = .084, TLI = .938, CFI = .947, and SRMR = .043).
The LM test suggested one more logical addition to the model. Modification
indices suggested adding a covariance between MI3 (“I have failed to protect someone at
work from unnecessary harm”) and MI8 (“I have not had access to the resources or
materials I needed to do my job in a way that protected other people at work”) where
both items refer to protecting others at work. After the modification was added, the model
fit was improved, (χ2 (101) = 195.218, p < .05, RMSEA = .079, TLI = .945, CFI = .954,
and SRMR = .041). Following the prior modifications, there were no other logical
suggestions provided by the LM test. Within the final model, items loadings ranged from
.68 to .90 (see Table 4). Given the good fit to the data, the product terms were used to
represent moral suffering when testing the remaining hypotheses, as opposed to the less
parsimonious approach of using separate frequency and intensity assessments.
Other Construct Measurement Models
In order to ensure that all other study variables were assessing their unique
constructs, a second set of CFAs’ was conducted on the established study measures. In
comparison to the first set of factor analyses, the CFA for the remainder of the study
variables only included the matched sample (N = 479) for validation, as the Time 2
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outcomes were used in the structural models. The fit statistics for all measurement
models can be found in Table 5.
Perceived Occupational Stigma
The CFA for the perceived occupational stigma measure showed adequate fit to
the data except for the RMSEA statistic, (χ2 (5) = 44.80, p < .05, RMSEA = .189, TLI =
.883, CFI = .942, and SRMR = .055). Item loadings ranged from .64 to .93. There were
no compelling adjustments made by the LM test that would theoretically make sense.
Therefore, no adjustments were made to the perceived occupational stigma measure.
Mental Health symptoms
The initial CFA that established the measurement model for mental health
symptoms did not fit well to the data, (χ2 (104) = 616.11, p < .05, RMSEA = .139, TLI =
.817, CFI = .841, and SRMR = .068). The mental health symptom measure was
developed by combining the depression and anxiety indicators into one construct, thus
there was conceptual rationale for splitting the two constructs into two latent constructs.
As a result, the model fit was improved, (χ2 (103) = 415.62, p < .05, RMSEA = .105, TLI
= .894, CFI = .909, and SRMR = .060). One item, DEP8 (“Moving or speaking so slowly
that other people have noticed? Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you
have been moving around a lot more than usual”) had a low factor loading compared to
the other items (ꞵ = .54), and thus was dropped from the model. Once DEP8 was
removed, the model fit was significantly improved, (χ2 (89) = 299.96, p < .05, RMSEA =
.092, TLI = .925, CFI = .937, and SRMR = .049).
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However, the LM test suggested further improvements. The most logical
modification with the highest predicted improvement suggested adding a residual
covariance between DEP3 (“Trouble falling or staying asleep or sleeping too much”) and
DEP4 (“Feeling tried or having little energy”), as both items refer to feeling extremely
tired. After the residual covariance was added between the two items, model fit improved
by χ2 = 77.49 and was deemed satisfactory, (χ2 (88) = 253.32, p < .05, RMSEA = .082,
TLI = .941, CFI = .950, and SRMR = .048). Item loadings ranged from .61 to .90. There
were no other compelling suggestions made by the LM test that would theoretically make
sense. Therefore, no more adjustments were made to the mental health symptoms
measure.
Meaningful Work
The initial meaningful work measurement CFA showed adequate fit to the data,
except for the RMSEA statistic (χ2 (35) = 339.029, p < .05, RMSEA = .168, TLI = .883,
CFI = .909, and SRMR = .042). However, the meaningful work assessment included
three subdimensions (positive meaning, meaning making through work, and greater good
motivations), so in order to improve model fit, the three subdimensions were accounted
for. The second CFA, including the three subdimension for meaningful work,
demonstrated much better fit to the data, χ2 (32) = 117.33, p < .05, RMSEA = .089, TLI =
.967, CFI = .977, and SRMR = .022). Upon examining the item loadings, MW8 had a
lower factor loading than the other items (“My work really makes no difference to the
world (r)”; ꞵ = .49), therefore, this item was dropped from the model. After the item was
dropped, model fit improved by χ2 =19.62 resulting in satisfactory model fit, except for
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the RMSEA statistic, χ2 (24) = 97.71, p < .05, RMSEA = .101, TLI = .965, CFI = .977,
and SRMR = .022). There were no other compelling suggestions made by the LM test
that would theoretically make sense. Therefore, no other adjustments were made to the
meaningful work measure.
All Study Variables CFA
The final CFA, which included the 5 latent variables (witness- and perpetrationbased moral suffering product scores, perceived occupational stigma, meaningful work,
and mental health symptoms) with their adjusted measurement models as described
above, demonstrated adequate model fit (χ2 (914) = 1714.426, p < .05, RMSEA = .049,
TLI = .933, CFI = .938, and SRMR = .050). Modification indices did not suggest any
rational changes and thus no further modifications were made.
Correlations with Outcomes
In order to assess the strength of relationships among study variables, bivariate
correlation analyses were conducted among the study variables. The correlations used a
mean composite score based on the measurement model at each time point. The
correlation table, along with Cronbach’s alphas on the diagonal, can be seen in Table 6.
Past research has suggested that novice workers (due to age and experience) in a
profession that is typically associated with a stigma increases the likelihood of negative
outcomes due to new employees lacking the experience of coping with the stereotypes
associated with work (Ghidina, 1992). Thus, age and tenure were added to the correlation
table to assess whether the proposed analyses would require including control variables.
Age was correlated with perpetration-based moral suffering, such that the older the
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participant the less likely they endorsed experiencing perpetration-based moral suffering
(r = -.11, p < .05). Age was also related to Time 2 mental health symptoms, such that the
older the participant, the less likely they experienced depression or anxiety symptoms (r
= -.10, p < .05). Tenure was correlated with meaningful work at both time points, such
that the longer a participant had worked at their current job the more meaningful work
they experienced (r’s = .16 - .18, p’s < .01). As a result of these findings, age and tenure
were used as control variables in the remainder of the study hypotheses.
As expected, witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering were positively
related. However, this relationship was only moderate (r = .34, p < .01). In general,
participants reported having low perceived occupational stigma, high meaningful work,
rarely engaged in counterproductive work behaviors, and had low mental health
symptoms. Additionally, witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering had moderate
positive relationships with perceived occupational stigma (r’s = .40, .27, p’s < .01,
respectively), mental health symptoms (r’s = .34, .22, p’s < .01, respectively) and
counterproductive work behaviors (r’s = .21, .41, p’s < .01, respectively). Interestingly,
there was a moderate negative relationship between witnessed-based moral suffering and
meaningful work (r = -.28, p < .01), while there was no significant relationship between
perpetration-based moral suffering and meaningful work. In general, all study variables
showed high test-retest correlations across the two time points in the study (r’s = .60 to
.80, p < .01).
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Structural Models of Moral Suffering Predicting Outcomes (H1 – 3)
The hypotheses examining whether moral suffering at Time 1 predicted mental
health symptoms (H1), meaningful work (H2), and counterproductive work behaviors
(H3) at Time 2 were analyzed with a series of structural equation models (SEM). SEM
allows multiple measurement models to be compared with the paths among the variables
estimated and adjusted as necessary. Similar to the CFA analyses, all items served as
indicators of the latent variables (except the frequency of engaging in CWBs which were
treated as an observed score). However, finding significant effects in complex SEM can
be difficult to obtain (Deng, Yang, & Marcoulides, 2018), and given the proposed
hypotheses required testing many different paths among the 4 latent variables (witness,
perpetration, frequency and intensity of moral suffering) and 3 latent outcomes, along
with the control variables, model convergence was unlikely if all outcome measures were
estimated at once. Therefore, each outcome variable was included in its own SEM, and
the moral suffering product terms were used as the latent predictors. The standardized
regression estimates (ꞵ) for each model can be found in Table 7. The initial model was
compared to a second model with the control variables of age, tenure, and Time 1
outcomes.
In order to provide additional insight into the unique contributions of the moral
suffering dimensions, two additional analyses were conducted. First, the models were
replicated with equality constraints between the moral suffering paths and the proposed
outcome. Constraining the parameters to be equal forced the models to make both moral
suffering latent variables to have equal loadings on the outcomes. The effects of the
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constrained model were compared by a Wald test using standardized regression
coefficients using the lavaan package (Klopp, 2020). Secondly, the semipartial
correlations were calculated for each model. The semipartial correlations were calculated
using the ppcor package (Kim, 2015). The semipartial correlation (sr2) removes the effect
of one predictor variable relative to another without removing the initial variables
relationship to the dependent variable (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). Thus, the
semipartial correlations represent the ‘unique’ contribution of the moral suffering
dimension (e.g., witness-based moral suffering) in relation to the outcome, above and
beyond the other dimension (e.g., perpetration-based moral suffering).
Mental Health Symptoms
Hypothesis 1, which stated that the moral suffering dimensions assessed at Time 1
would uniquely predict increased mental health symptoms at Time 2, was partially
supported. Witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering product terms were entered
in an SEM predicting mental health symptoms. The full model demonstrated good fit
with the data (χ2 (427) = 944.199, p < .05, RMSEA = .065, TLI = .910, CFI = .917, and
SRMR = .053). The predictors explained 18% of the variance in mental health symptoms
(f 2=.22). Although both predictors displayed significant positive bivariate correlations
with mental health symptoms, only witness-based moral suffering was a significant
predictor of Time 2 mental health symptoms in the structural model (ꞵ= .38 p < .01). The
results remained significant even after controlling for age and tenure, however, the
relationship was no longer significant after controlling for Time 1 mental health
symptoms.
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The model was refit to the data using equality constraints. The paths between
witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-based moral suffering were constrained to
be equal in predicting mental health symptoms. The constrained model decreased
witness-based moral suffering from ꞵ = .38 in the unconstrainted model to ꞵ = .22 in the
constrained model. However, the Wald test suggested that there was not a significant
difference among the standardized regression coefficients (W = 1.83, n.s.). Thus,
according to the Wald test, the relative effects of the constrained and unconstrained paths
between the moral suffering predictors on mental health symptoms were not statistically
different from one another. In contrast, the semipartial correlations indicated that witnessbased moral suffering at Time 1 uniquely accounted for 8% of the variance in mental
health symptoms at Time 2 (p < .01), while perpetration-based moral suffering uniquely
accounted for 1% of the variance in mental health symptoms at Time 2 (p < .05). In
summary, the results provided two pieces of evidence to support Hypothesis 1a.
Meaningful Work
Hypothesis 2, which stated that the moral suffering dimensions assessed at Time 1
would uniquely predict decreased meaningful work at Time 2, was also partially
supported. The Time 1 moral suffering product terms were entered into the model
predicting meaningful work at Time 2. The model fit the data adequately (χ2 (267) =
563.316, p < .05, RMSEA = .063, TLI = .942, CFI = .948, and SRMR = .047) and
explained 6% of the variance in meaningful work (f 2=.07). Similar to the bivariate
correlation estimates, the SEM regression estimates indicated that witness-based moral
suffering was the only predictor of meaningful work (ꞵ = -.36, p < .01). Witness-based
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moral suffering had a moderate negative relationship with meaningful work at Time 2,
such that increased witness-based moral suffering experiences predicted lower
meaningful work over time. The relationship was still significant after controlling for age
and tenure, and marginally significant after controlling for Time 1 meaningful work (p =
.059). Interestingly, when Time 1 meaningful work was added to the model, perpetrationbased moral suffering appeared as a significant predictor (ꞵ = .51, p < .01). Due to the
initial non-significant finding and consequent reciprocal sign change, this finding is likely
due to suppression. Statistical suppression occurs when at least one predictor has a
standardized regression estimate (ꞵ) or semi-partial correlation (sr) that is larger in
magnitude or has a reverse sign than its respective raw correlation with the outcome
(Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 1978). Perpetration-based moral suffering had a standardized
regression of ꞵ = .21 and sr = -.27, whereas its raw correlation with meaningful work was
r = - .05, satisfying both conditions of suppression.
The model was refit to the data using equality constraints. The paths between
witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-based moral suffering were constrained to
be equal in predicting meaningful work. The results of the Wald test suggested that there
was a significant difference among the standardized regression coefficients (W = 4.04, p
< .05). According to the Wald test, the relative effects of the moral suffering predictors
on meaningful work were not equivalent. The constrained model decreased witness-based
moral suffering from ꞵ = -.36 in the unconstrainted model to ꞵ = -.11 in the constrained
model. Further, the semipartial correlations indicated that witness-based moral suffering
at Time 1 uniquely accounted for 8% of the variance in meaningful work at Time 2 (p <
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.01) while perpetration-based moral suffering did not uniquely account for any of the
variance in meaningful work at Time 2 (sr2 = .002, n.s.). Therefore, only Hypothesis 2a
was supported; witness-based moral suffering was the only predictor to consistently
contribute unique variance in predicting meaningful work.
Counterproductive Work Behaviors
Hypothesis 3, which stated that the moral suffering dimensions assessed at Time 1
would uniquely predict increased counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) at Time 2,
was partially supported. The Time 1 moral suffering product terms were entered into the
model predicting CWBs at Time 2. The model fit the data adequately (χ2 (115) =
306.172, p < .05, RMSEA = .088, TLI = .893, CFI =.910, and SRMR =.056) and
explained 9% of the variance in counterproductive work behaviors (f 2=.10). Regression
estimates showed that perpetration-based moral suffering had a statistically significant
relationship with engaging in CWBs (ꞵ = .38, p < .01). The results were still significant
even after controlling for age and tenure, however, were no longer significant when
controlling for Time 1 CWBs.
The model was refit to the data using equality constraints. The paths between
witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-based moral suffering were constrained to
be equal in predicting counterproductive work behaviors. The results of the Wald test
suggest that there was a significant difference among the standardized regression
coefficients (W = 5.03, p < .05). According to the Wald test, the relative effects of the
moral suffering predictors on counterproductive work behaviors were not equivalent. The
constrained model decreased perpetration-based moral suffering from ꞵ = .38 in the
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unconstrainted model to ꞵ = .14 in the constrained model. Further, the semipartial
correlations indicated that perpetration-based moral suffering at Time 1 uniquely
accounted for 13% of the variance in counterproductive work behaviors at Time 2 (p <
.01), while witness-based moral suffering did not uniquely accounted any of the variance
in counterproductive work behaviors at Time 2 (sr2 = .006, n.s.). Therefore, only
Hypothesis 3b was supported.
Structural Models of Perceived Occupational Stigma Moderating the Relationships
Between Moral Suffering and Outcomes (H4 - 6)
The second set of SEMs examined perceived occupational stigma as a moderator
of the relationships between moral suffering and the three outcomes (H4-6). The
interaction terms were created through the double-mean centering technique (Lin et al.,
2010) using the ‘indProd’ function of the semTools package (Jorgensen,
Pornprasertmanit, Schoemann, & Rosseel, 2021). The predictor and moderator indicators
were mean centered, then ranked in terms of relative factor loading. The indicator item
with the highest factor loading on each moral suffering factor was multiplied by the
indicator variable with the highest factor loading for the perceived occupational stigma
items, resulting in 5 product variables. These final cross products were mean centered
again. Each SEM interaction model was first assessed using just the main effects
(witness-based and perpetration-based moral suffering, perceived occupational stigma)
and the interaction terms, then a second model which included the control variables, age
and tenure, as well as the Time 1 outcomes, were added to the model. If the interactions
between the moral suffering dimensions and perceived occupational stigma were
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significant, tests of simple slopes were conducted at low (-1 SD), medium (M), and high
levels of stigma (+1 SD). Regression estimates are displayed in Table 8.
Mental Health Symptoms
Hypothesis 4 proposed that high levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time
1 would moderate the relationship between moral suffering at Time 1 and mental health
symptoms at Time 2. Due to the high number of parameters that were needed to be
estimated, the model did not fit the data well, (χ2 (969) = 3389.08, p < .05, RMSEA =
.106, TLI = .734, CFI =.751, and SRMR =.06). The predictors explained 35% of the
variance in mental health symptoms (f 2=.54). Regression estimates showed that there
were main effects for both witness-based moral suffering (ꞵ = .58) and perpetration-based
moral suffering (ꞵ= .84, p <.01), as well as a main effect for perceived occupational
stigma (ꞵ= .79, p < .01), predicting Time 2 mental health symptoms.
There was also a significant interaction between witness-based moral suffering
and perceived occupational stigma predicting mental health symptoms at Time 2 (ꞵ = .68, p <.05). The simple slopes were significant at low (-1 SD) and medium (M) levels of
perceived occupational stigma (p’s < .05), but not at high levels. Therefore, the
relationship between witness-based moral suffering and mental health symptoms
primarily occurred if employees perceived that they worked in a less stigmatized
occupation. Similarly, the interaction between perpetration-based moral suffering and
perceived occupational stigma was also a significant predictor of mental health
symptoms. The simple slopes were significant at low (-1 SD) and medium (M) levels of
perceived occupational stigma (p’s < .05), but not at high levels. Therefore, the
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relationship between perpetration-based moral suffering and mental health symptoms
primarily occurred if employees perceived that they worked in a less stigmatized
occupation (ꞵ= -.76, p < .01). The relationship was not significant after controlling for
age, tenure, and Time 1 mental health symptoms.
It is important to note that the standardized regression estimates for the interaction
terms were negative, whereas all of the main effects had positive regression estimates,
suggesting initial evidence of suppression. Statistical suppression occurs when at least
one predictor has a standardized regression estimate (ꞵ) that is larger in magnitude or has
a reverse sign than its respective raw correlation with the outcome (Lubin, 1957; Velicer,
1978). Witness-based moral suffering had a main effect of ꞵ = .58 and perpetration-based
moral suffering had a main effect of ꞵ = .84 in predicting mental health symptoms,
whereas the raw correlations were much lower (r = .34, r = .22, respectively).
Additionally, when the witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering variables were
entered into separate models with perceived occupational stigma and the respective
interaction term, there was no significant main effects or interactions found predicting
mental health symptoms. In summary, the interactions were considered statistical artifacts
and not meaningful in interpretation, thus Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Meaningful Work
Hypothesis 5 suggested that high levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time
1 would moderate the relationship between moral suffering at Time 1 and meaningful
work at Time 2. Due to the high number of parameters that were needed to be estimated,
the model did not fit the data well, (χ2 (720) = 2795.89, p < .05, RMSEA = .120, TLI =
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.736, CFI =.756 and SRMR =.056) with the predictors explaining 20.3% of the variance
in meaningful work (f 2=.25). Within the full model, there was a main effect for
perpetration-based moral suffering (ꞵ = - .51, p < .05) and perceived occupational stigma
(ꞵ= -.66, p < .01). There was also a significant interaction between perpetration-based
moral suffering and perceived occupational stigma predicting meaningful work at Time 2
(ꞵ = .65, p < .01). The simple slopes were significant at low (-1 SD) and medium (M)
levels of perceived occupational stigma, but not at high levels. Therefore, the relationship
between perpetration-based moral suffering and meaningful work primarily occurred if
employees perceived that they worked in a less stigmatized occupation. The relationship
was still significant even after controlling for age and tenure, but not when controlling for
Time 1 meaningful work.
However, similar to the previous model’s interactions, there appears to be
evidence of suppression (Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 1978). The standardized regression
estimate for perpetration-based moral suffering predicting meaningful work transformed
from a negative relationship in the main effects, to a positive relationship for the
interaction term with perceived occupational stigma. Additionally, the bivariate
correlation between perpetration-based moral suffering and meaningful work was not
significant. Further, when perpetration-based moral suffering and its respective
interaction term were entered into a separate model on their own (without witness-based
moral suffering predictors) there was not a significant main effect for perpetration-based
moral suffering or a significant interaction predicting meaningful work. In summary, the
interaction was considered a statistical artifact and not meaningful to interpret.
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Counterproductive Work Behaviors
Hypothesis 6 suggested that high levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time
1 would moderate the relationships between moral suffering at Time 1 and
counterproductive work behaviors assessed at Time 2. Similar to the previous models,
due to the increased set of parameters estimated, the model did not fit the data well, (χ2
(448) = 2051.143 p < .05, RMSEA = .150, TLI = .648, CFI =.682, and SRMR =.066).
There was a main effect between perceived occupational stigma at Time 1 on CWBs at
Time 2 (ꞵ = .44, p < .05). However, there were no main effects found for the moral
suffering components and no significant interactions within the full model. Thus,
Hypothesis 6 was not supported.
Although each model was assessed in terms of its fit indices, it is important to
acknowledge that the interaction models had ‘poor fit’ according to standard cutoffs.
While poor fit indices indicate that the model does not strongly fit the data, this does not
mean that the models do not represent the general trends in the data. Additionally, SEM
literature typically relies on cut off scores that were created by Hu and Bentler (1999; χ2 p
> .05, RMSEA < .08, CFI ≥ .90, and SRMR < .08). However recent research has noted
that these standard cut offs are not necessarily generalizable to all models and data types
(McNeish, An, & Hancock, 2018). McNeish and colleagues (2018) have coined the term
‘reliability paradox’ noting that model fit cutoffs penalize models that contain high factor
loadings. The authors state that “although [Hu and Bentler] manipulated many conditions
when deriving their cutoff values, the strength of the standardized factor loadings was
kept constant throughout their entire study… [where] all of these conditions were tested
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with factor loadings that were always near 0.70” (p. 44). The authors found that when
factor loadings are low (.40) or high (.90) the model fit indices varied significantly in
what would be consider ‘good model fit’ and thus researchers should be warry when
making conclusions about model fit when the loadings are not equivalent to .70. Instead,
McNeish et al. (2018) suggest that poor fit does not matter as much as the loadings do,
model fit indices should be interpreted in the context of your average standardized
loading. Within the current study, the average standardized factor loadings for witnessbased moral suffering, perpetration-based moral suffering, and perceived occupational
stigma were greater than .70 and thus the model fit indices were liked to be penalized.
The Implications of COVID19
During the time of this study, the COVID19 pandemic was infecting the world
and interfering with individuals work lives. Participants were asked some follow-up
questions to ensure that the study variables were not influenced by these changes. The
majority of participants responded that their work has not changed due to the pandemic
(67%), followed by 38% were working from home, 20% worked some days in office
while others were at home, 2% reported working at a different location (that is not their
home), 11% were working reduced hours, 9% were working increased hours, and .5% of
participants reported that they were not currently working due to the pandemic.
Additionally, after participants responded to the moral suffering items, they were asked
“To what extent did your responses to the previous questions refer to situations that were
caused by COVID19? (ie. If the pandemic did not exist, would these issues still occur at
work?)”. Participants reported that the pandemic had no effect at all on their responses
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(40%), a little (27%), a moderate amount (20%), a lot (8%), and a great deal (5%) in
regard to the moral injury section of questions. Similar results were found following the
moral distress questionnaire, participants reported that the pandemic had no effect at all
on their responses (48%), a little (25%), a moderate amount (13%), a lot (8%), and a
great deal (6%).
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
While the present study did not provide empirical support for all of the proposed
hypotheses, the findings from the moral suffering measurement model expand the
knowledge of the construct of moral suffering within the literature. Prior research has
utilized the terms moral injury and moral distress in inconsistent ways (Sugrue, 2019).
There is clear need for clarification within the moral suffering literature to distinguish
how these terms are related and whether they are assessing unique constructs. The present
study is one of the first to compare the experiences of moral injury and moral distress in
one large sample. The findings demonstrate the factor structure of moral suffering,
relationships with mental health symptoms, meaningful work and counterproductive
work behaviors and some initial evidence for interaction effects with perceived
occupational stigma.
The Measurement of Moral Suffering
In the first set of analyses, the measurement model of moral suffering was
thoroughly examined. While the main research question of the current study was to
investigate the dimensionality of moral injury and moral distress as single or separate
entities, the results indicated that moral injury and moral distress are not distinct
constructs. Instead, there was a different two-factor structure present within the moral
suffering model. Whereas previous research has separated the constructs by the content
of the suffering (harm versus judgement), the current study provides evidence that the
items are assessing the same construct. Instead, employees appear to differentiate moral
suffering involving circumstances where an individual witnesses others at work engaging
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in decisions or actions that violate their personal sense of right and wrong, versus feeling
forced to engage in those actions themselves and being a perpetrator in the event.
The findings support previous research that has suggested that outcomes may
differ depending on the nature of one’s involvement in an event (Jameton, 1993;
Drescher et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2017; Litz et al., 2009, Stein, et al., 2016). Within his
conceptualization of moral distress, Jameton (1993) described how moral distress is most
often a result of an individual’s sense of moral responsibility for the situation, despite
whether the individual was directly responsible for the event. He stated that whether the
individual was making the decision themselves or having to witness others engage in acts
they disagree with, the individual perceives an obligation to do what’s right as a
participant in the situation. Although Jameton (1984; 1993) proposed the distinction
between perpetrating and witnessing events in his original work, the moral distress
literature has not prioritized this distinction.
Although both witness- and perpetration-based actions are embedded within the
common definition of moral injury (see Hodgson & Carey, 2017 for a table of
definitions), assessments vary in the factorial separation of witness- and perpetrationbased moral injury. The measurement models underlying moral injury measures vary
between one (MIQ-M, Currier et al., 2013; MIQ-T; Currier et al., 2015), two (Jordan et
al., 2017; Litz et al., 2018; MIES, Nash et al., 2013; Yeterian et al., 2019), or three factor
structures (Braitman et al., 2018; Bryan et al., 2014; 2016), with inconsistent factor
labels amongst studies. For example, the Morally Injurious Events Scale (MIES; Nash et
al., 2013) includes two factors describing perceived transgressions and perceived
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betrayals where both witness- and perpetration-based moral injury were collapsed into
the transgression factor, whereas Jordan et al. (2017) utilized the same measure but
removed the witness-based items.
The findings of the current study support the measurement structure by Litz et al.
(2018) and Yeterian et al. (2019), who conceptualized the two-factor structure of moral
injury as Moral Injury-Self (reflecting perpetration-based items in the current study) and
Moral Injury-Other (reflecting witness-based items in the current study). There is
inconsistent research supporting the factor structure of moral injury and thus future
research is needed to clarify the measurement model of moral injury that does not
confound with other constructs. Results could differ due to various referents and should
be considered in further analyses or scale development. The person that a participant
witnesses engaging in moral suffering (coworker verses a supervisor) or the target to
which the action effects (other coworkers, clients, or oneself) may influence the impact
on outcomes. For example, moral suffering may result from just one individual at work or
many individuals reflecting on the organizational culture. Future research should
investigate the context to which circumstances arise and the impact on individual
wellbeing and retaliation behaviors.
As previously stated by Williamson et al. (2018) “some existing measures do not
include exposure to a variety of [potentially morally injurious experiences] or confound
[potentially morally injurious experiences] exposure with the psychological effects of
exposure” (p. 345). One of the most often utilized scales is the Moral Injury
Questionnaire (MIQ; Currier et al, 2013; 2015) where both the frequency of events and
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the effects of exposure are combined into one measure. As previous research has
demonstrated the differing effects of frequency and intensity items, measures that include
both elements may be misrepresenting the construct. Additionally, many measures
include a factor of perceived betrayal (e.g., Bryan et al., 2014; 2016; Joran et al., 2017;
Nash et al., 2013). However, it is hard to conceptually distinguish between perceived
betrayal and witness- and perpetration-based moral injury. Perceived betrayal has been
defined as “perceived deception or treachery by others,” which could result from
witnessing another individual engaging in a ‘treacherous’ action or feeling deceived and
forced to engage in actions. The perceived betrayal items may load on their own factor
solely due to having the same stem in the three items (e.g., “I feel betrayed by
(leaders/coworkers)”).
The measurement problem may also be due to the separation of the moral injury
and moral distress domains. The current study provided evidence for a single moral
suffering construct that includes both the domains of moral injury and moral distress. The
inconsistent factor structure findings within the moral injury literature may be due to
some measures incorporating aspects of distress while others do not. Future research
should aim to develop a comprehensive scale that encompasses the entire domain of
moral suffering while accounting for self- and other-orientated actions.
Moral Suffering Predicting the Three Outcomes
Due to the complexity of the structural equation models, the moral suffering
components were examined as product scores of the frequency and the degree to which
the situation caused suffering. Previous researchers have examined the implications of
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assessing the frequency and degree to which moral suffering differs in how they impact
psychological outcomes (Corley, 2002; Currier et al., 2018; Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012;
Griffin et al., 2019; Koenig et al., 2018; Mobley et al., 2007; Ohnishi et al., 2010).
Therefore, the evaluation of how often an individual is exposed to an event in
combination with the degree of distress experienced provides a comprehensive measure
of the moral suffering experience. Following the work of Corley (1995), the product
terms were developed by multiplying the frequency item with its respective intensity
item. Preliminary results assessed the frequency and intensity scores as separate variables
within the model, however the models were under-identified and produced very poor
model fit indices. The relationships that were found within the preliminary assessment of
these separated variables were replicated with the product terms.
The first set of hypotheses proposed that an individual’s mental health symptoms,
meaningful work and counterproductive work behaviors will be predicted by moral
suffering. Despite significant bivariate correlations between both the moral suffering
dimensions and outcomes, the SEM analyses indicated that only one dimension
contributed unique variance to the outcomes in each model. The results demonstrate that
when accounting for one moral suffering dimension, the other does not provide additional
predictive value. The findings suggest that future research should continue to evaluate the
dimensionality of moral suffering and attempt to parcel out the unique contributions of
each dimension.
Furthermore, Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3b were supported. Specifically, individuals
who witnessed others at work engaging in behaviors that conflicted with their moral
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values reported higher mental health symptoms (H1a) and lower meaningful work (H2a).
Past research has demonstrated the relationship between moral suffering and mental
health (Backholm & Idås, 2015; Colville et al., 2019; Lamiani et al., 2018). Individuals
have reported increased guilt from knowing the right course of action was not taken and
shame for being associated with the event or organization. The conflict of believing the
right course of action and observing the opposite occur, can interfere with employee’s
trust in others causing doubt in other’s intensions. The current study contributes to the
literature by replicating previous findings that indicated witness-based moral suffering
uniquely predicts increased mental health symptoms in the broader working population.
Previous research found that witnessing others engage in events that caused moral
suffering contributed more to PTSD symptoms than when the individual was involved in
the event themselves (Bryan et al., 2016; Fitzpatrick & Wilson, 1999).
Similarly, the results of Hypothesis 2a found that higher witness-based moral
suffering predicted lower meaningful work. The findings suggest that moral suffering can
influence how an individual perceives their occupational purpose. Prior research has
found that moral suffering can increase an individual’s doubts about oneself and how
they make sense of the world (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015). Through witnessing
events that conflict with one’s moral values, an individual loses faith in others to act in an
appropriate ‘just’ manner. The findings were not significant for perpetration-based moral
suffering. When individuals feel forced to engage in behaviors they do not agree with, the
individual has the ability to rationalize the action or inability to act as they are aware of
the constraints. The individual acknowledges that there are protocols or rules set in place
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that are forcing them to perpetrate in the behavior, and thus rationalizing the event may
not diminish one’s perception of self-worth in their role.
If an individual observes others acting in ways that conflict with their own
personal values, they may not be fully aware of the circumstance that the other person is
limited to. The Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross, 1977) describes how individuals
tend to over emphasize a person’s dispositional traits and underestimate the situational
circumstances when observing other’s behaviors. One study assessing the attribution in
moral responsibility found that individuals were more likely to assign responsibility to an
observed actor, the more the actor identified with the situation, “even when the action
was performed under constraints so powerful that no other behavioral option was
available” (Woolfolk, et al., 2006, p. 283). Assignment of responsibility based on
witnessing others engage in actions that are against one’s beliefs can affect one’s
meaning making system.
Interestingly, perpetration-based moral suffering was only a unique predictor of
organizationally deviant behaviors. CWBs involve personal acts of withdrawal that
contribute to organization inefficiency such as coming in late and taking longer breaks.
Litz et al. (2009) described that when individuals experience continued conflict between
events that occur and their moral schema, individuals tend to ruminate on their actions,
and due to self-unforgiveness, exhibit withdrawal behaviors. Alternatively, CWBs also
involve stealing and misuse of company resources. Bryan et al. (2016) found that
perpetration-based moral suffering was most strongly predictive of pessimism and anger.
Individuals may seek to engage in retaliation behaviors in order to ‘get back at’ the

97

organization for putting them in a position where they have to act against what they
believed was right (Ahmed & Khan, 2016). An individual may steal resources in order to
balance the field. The nonsignificant findings for witness-based moral suffering may be
due to witnessing the acts of others as organizationally deviant, and thus the individual is
less likely to engage in additional CWBs themselves in order to avoid continuing the
problem. Witnessing based moral suffering serves as a deterrent for engaging in CWBs
oneself.
Although CWBs are typically defined as employee deviance, this negative
connotation may not hold true in the context of moral suffering. When individuals act out
against the organization, the refusal to endorse actions that violate their morals could be
seen as a form of moral courage, standing up for one’s beliefs (Sekerka, Bagozzi &
Charnigo, 2009). Some CWB items such as item 7, “Neglected to follow your boss's
instructions” may be deviant in an ambiguous circumstance, however when considering a
situation where the individual feels the action as being ‘wrong’, the individual is refusing
to endorse violating their value system. Similarly, an individual could seek support as in
item 9 “discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person” in
order to reduce the guilt from engaging in those actions. Future research should continue
to investigate the interplay between moral suffering and CWBs with the consideration of
individuals refusing to conduct work tasks due to the moral conflict experienced.
The Moderating Effect of Perceived Occupational Stigma
The second set of hypotheses asserted that perceived occupational stigma would
magnify the effects of moral suffering on the outcomes. While Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 5b
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were statistically supported, the results indicated suppression effects had occurred based
on the inflated standardized regression coefficients in comparison to their raw
correlations. Suppression occurs when there is an increase in the prediction of a criterion
by including another predictor, which increases the variance explained due to accounting
for residual errors (Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 1978). Researchers have also demonstrated that
the probability of suppression is increased with latent variables, two wave models, and
when the latent variables are corrected for measurement errors (Maassen & Bakker,
2001). Thus, the current study utilized indicators to represent the latent variables, with
two time points, and using the Satorra-Bentler corrections for nonnormally.
In order to provide additional evidence of suppression, witness- and perpetrationbased moral suffering were entered into separate models with perceived occupational
stigma and the respective interaction term, resulting in no significant main effects or
interactions found. Thus, the interactions were classified as statistical artifacts and not
meaningful. It is evident that the moral suffering variables acted as suppressors due to
their moderate relationship, inflating the variance explained by the predictors. Perceived
occupational stigma had moderate correlations with all study variables and thus future
research should aim to replicate the study’s hypotheses with different temporal separation
between waves of data collection and attempt to capture the incremental validity of each
moral suffering dimension by reducing the overlap in the prediction on outcomes.
Another reason the suppression effect may have occurred is the multifaceted
nature of perceived occupational stigma. Researchers have suggested that perceived
occupational stigma is a multidimensional construct involving physical, social, and moral
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‘taint’ (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Hughes, 1951). Workers within each of these
categories may experience moral suffering to differing degrees and may be impacted
differently due to their classification. Additionally, Ashforth and Kreiner (1999)
described how occupational prestige can form as a buffer to perceived stigma.
Occupational prestige is a composite of status, power, quality of work, education, and
income that forms a ‘status shield’ (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989; Treiman, 1977). For
example, a lawyer is considered to have a ‘moral’ stigma in that their work may involve
defending a violent murderer, however, a lawyer also has high occupational prestige due
to the education needed for the position and wealth that results. The suppression results
of the current study may have been influenced due to the broad classification of perceived
occupational stigma without piecing apart the unique influences that each type of stigma
may involve and whether the occupation has prestige. Future research should consider the
dynamic relationships of perceived occupational stigma’s impact on moral suffering.
Implications of Findings
The present study contributes to the literature in several ways. As previously
noted by other researchers (Sugrue, 2019; Williamson et al., 2018; 2020), there is a lack
of research examining moral suffering in a variety of industries. The majority of
published studies have been conducted in military and healthcare settings. The current
study obtained a matched sample of 479 participants from 20 different industries in a
variety of occupational settings that acknowledged experiencing some degree of moral
suffering. With findings demonstrating the prevalence of moral suffering occurring
across industries, future research should continue to assess moral suffering outside of the
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military and healthcare domains in order to understand other occupational health
outcomes that these industries may be facing due to moral suffering. Occupations that
have differing degrees of power, agency, and status could impact the occurrence of moral
suffering and the extent to which outcomes are affected. Future research should consider
ways to break down job types further and examine what job factors may increase the
likelihood of moral suffering to occur. Other constructs such as organizational culture
would provide a deeper understanding of the larger organizational outcomes that are due
to moral suffering. The current study provided evidence that moral suffering exists in the
broader population and future research should continue to investigate the various ways
moral suffering impacts specific occupational industries.
Additionally, the large sample size contributes to the strength of the SEMs that
are required to detect and appropriately interpret effects increases (Barrett, 2007; Kline,
2015). Prior research has relied on cross-sectional designs, limiting the knowledge of
causal outcomes of moral suffering (Sugrue, 2019). The current study assessed all study
outcomes three months following the initial intake of exposure and effects of moral
suffering.
This study also adds to previous research in that the measurement of moral
suffering was examined more in depth than previous studies. The current study is one of
the first and only to assess moral injury and moral distress in one model, providing
evidence of the overall measurement structure of moral suffering. The current study
utilized a random split half sample method for examining the two-factor structure of
witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering with adequate model fit indices. The
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findings provide evidence for the future assessment of moral suffering to consider the
inclusion of both domains of distress and injury and with the focus on the act of the
individual rather than the context to which the event occurred. Additionally, future
research should consider using a single term such as moral suffering when referring to
work obligations that conflict with one’s values, in order to minimize the confusion
within the literature that suggests moral injury and moral distress are separate constructs.
Another strength of the current study was all of the findings remained significant
even after controlling for age and tenure. The outcomes could have been more salient as
individuals increase in age and the longer an individual works within their career and thus
could have influenced the hypothesized relationships. Over time, individuals may
gradually become ‘numb’ to the organizational regulations and thus no longer be affected
by moral suffering. Age and tenure did not affect the findings within the current study.
However, the findings were no longer significant when controlling for Time 1 outcomes.
Because individual strain measures are typically stable over time, a large proportion of
the variance of the dependent variable is already explained. Thus, there was little
variance left to be explained after controlling for Time 1 outcomes. It is not surprising
that when controlling for mental health symptoms, meaningful work, and
counterproductive work behaviors at Time 1, there was not enough variance to account
for at Time 2. The Time 1 and Time 2 predictors were highly correlated with one another
and the time frame between the two assessment periods may have been too small to
notice a change.
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Limitations
While the current study has expanded the knowledge of moral suffering, there are
a few limitations that are important to note and highlight areas for future research. First,
although the diversity of the sample is seen as a strength of the current study, the
participant pool was collected through an online data source, Mturk. Mturk has been
established as a credible source of information for occupational health research (Michel
et al., 2018) and representative of the US working population (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett,
2013; Michel, O’Neill, Hartman, & Lorys, 2018). However, researchers have warned
against convenience sampling issues that the site may provide (Paolacci & Chandler,
2014). Future research should aim to replicate the findings of the current study with a true
random sample of the population.
Additionally, although the measurement model of moral suffering was examined
in depth through inclusion of previously established measurement components (injury,
distress, witnessing, perpetrating, frequency and intensity), the model still relied on initial
construct validity of the original measures. The moral injury and distress measures were
obtained from three previously validated scales but were developed for a specific sample
and a limited definition. Based on the findings of the current study, future researchers
should aim to develop a measure of moral suffering that encompasses the full domain of
moral violations that may occur at work. Researchers are encouraged to conduct an
extensive review of the literature, informing the development of structured interviews
with individuals in a wide range of occupations, and develop a comprehensive measure
that increases the content validity of the scale. A high-quality assessment of moral
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suffering is needed that has the ability to assess the construct in a variety of occupations.
Future research should seek to clarify the definition and measurement of moral suffering
in order to understand the experience employees are facing rather than continued
adaption of potentially flawed existing measures.
Another consideration of the current study is based on the language used for the
intensity scale. While there is a clear need to distinguish the frequency of events
occurring and the degree to which the event caused moral suffering, the language used to
target the intensity may not have fully captured the experience of moral suffering.
Following the guidance of previous researchers (e.g., Braitman et al., 2018; Glasberg et
al., 2006), each situation was followed by an item that read, “to what degree did this
situation upset you?” however, moral suffering involves feelings of guilt, shame, and
helplessness that may not have been captured within the term “upset”. Future research
should assess moral suffering with the technique conducted by Braitman et al. (2018).
The authors utilized a modified version of the MIQ-M (Currier, Holland, Drescher, &
Foy, 2015) but followed each situation with five questions that assessed the degree to
which each situation caused them to: 1) “feel guilt”, 2) “feel shame”, 3) “have difficulties
with forgiving myself”, 4) “have difficulties forgiving others”, and 5) “become
withdrawn” for each experience. Future research should incorporate this methodology to
ensure that the full domain of moral suffering is captured.
Another limitation of this study was due to influences outside of the study’s
control. During the time of this study, a global pandemic was infecting the world,
interfering with individuals lives inside and outside of the work domain. Researchers
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have described the implications that COVID19 has had on daily work hours, work role
expectations, work-life balance and new safety protocols (Borges et al., 2020; Cacchione,
2020). One potential impact of the pandemic on the present study is related to work from
home regulations. While individuals work from home, they are less likely to experience
witness-based moral suffering as the circumstances are not as visibly present with
individuals working in separate locations. Additionally, the impact of perpetration-based
moral suffering may have been intensified as individuals were working alone and could
have felt more compelled to engage in decision making that violated their morals without
the support of their coworkers. In some industries where employees were able to continue
work in person, extreme safety protocols and restrictions were in place that could have
also increased the likelihood of moral suffering for both dimensions. However, data was
collected on the impact of COVID19 on the study variables (see Results) and participants
generally reported that the situations were not unique to the pandemic. While the
additional information collected on COVID19 changes were helpful to understand how
work has changed during the data collection period it is likely that the pandemic may
have increased the strength of the relationships between moral suffering and mental
health symptoms, meaningful work and counterproductive work behaviors. Future
research is needed to investigate these relationships when life returns to ‘normal.’
Conclusion
The current study has significant theoretical and practical applications to the field
of Industrial-Organizational Psychology. First, the diversity of professions that were
represented within the present study has expanded upon the literature of moral suffering
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by demonstrating the frequency and intensity of distress experienced in the workplace
beyond healthcare and military contexts. In addition, the current study has clarified the
dimensionality of moral suffering to include witness- and perpetration-based moral
suffering rather than the traditional terms of moral injury and moral distress. The current
study has provided researchers with a broader understanding of the impact of moral
suffering on mental health symptoms, meaningful work, and counterproductive work
behaviors.
Numerous authors have discussed strategies for addressing moral distress and
moral injury (see Epstein, 2010 and Litz et al., 2009 for a review). Furthermore,
researchers have begun to identify ‘missing’ components of interventions aimed to treat
PTSD in military samples (Gray et al., 2012; Litz et al., 2009), it may also be that other
interventions conducted in the workplace aimed at reducing stress may be overlooking
the intense experience of moral suffering. The practical value of the findings is evident as
they can provide an understanding of the impact of moral wrongdoing conducted in the
workplace.
Within her review of moral distress, Epstein (2010) suggested that intervening on
outcomes associated with moral suffering achieves several goals such as raising
awareness to the ‘silent harm’ that individuals face and reduces the threat to individuals
personal and professional integrity which contributes to their sense of meaning. While
not every stressor can be removed from the workplace, organizations that acknowledge
the circumstances that surround a moral dissonance, can provide support and resources to
their employees to flatten the incremental effects of moral suffering. Organizations can
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minimize the perceived powerlessness and helplessness that surrounds moral suffering,
through giving a voice to those experiencing dissonance regardless of the industry
(Epstein & Delgado, 2010). Research has demonstrated the impact of employee voice on
reporting ethical issues leading to turnover intentions (Burnett, 2019). Organizations
should ensure that there are procedures in place for employees to express their concerns
when moral suffering occurs and that the appropriate attention is placed on addressing
these concerns. Considering work is a socially rich environment where individuals
identify and represent the career to outsiders, organizations should be aware of the
internal struggle employees may be facing and what changes can be made to reduce the
burden of these encounters.
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Figure 1. Proposed model showing hypothesized relationships
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Figure 2. Structural Equation Models for Hypotheses 1-3. The figure represents the
conceptual SEMs demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors,
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Each dependent variable was
modeled on its own with the predictor variables. Witness- and perpetration-based moral
suffering were analyzed via product scores of the frequency and intensity items.
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Figure 3. Structural Equation Model for Hypotheses 4. The figure represents the
conceptual SEM demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors,
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Witness- and perpetration-based
moral suffering were analyzed via product scores of the frequency and intensity items.
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Figure 4. Structural Equation Model for Hypotheses 5. The figure represents the
conceptual SEM demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors,
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Witness- and perpetration-based
moral suffering were analyzed via product scores of the frequency and intensity items.
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Figure 5. Structural Equation Model for Hypotheses 6. The figure represents the
conceptual SEM demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors,
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Witness- and perpetration-based
moral suffering were analyzed via product scores of the frequency and intensity items.
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APPENDIX A – A Measure of Morally Injurious Events
Considering your experiences at your job, select the choice that indicates how often you
have experienced each of the following situations over the past 3 months.
For the items that contain ‘someone,’ ‘others’ or ’people’ at work, refer to anyone you
are in contact with (e.g., your coworkers, clients, patients) on a regular basis.
Frequency (#) Response Scale:

Intensity (B) Response Scale:

1= Never, have no experience
2= Rarely, once over the three months
3= Sometimes, more than once over the three months
4= Often, every month
5= Very often, every week
6= Always, everyday
Items indicated with a * are perpetration-based items

1= Not at all
2 = Very little
3 = A little
4 = Moderately
5= Quite a bit
6= Extremely

Over the past 3 months….
1) I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that betrayed my
trust.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
2) I have seen people taking revenge for actions that have happened at work.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*3) I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
4) I have seen someone unnecessarily harmed at work.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*5) I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe when I know
others at work cannot.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*6) I failed to take action in helping someone at work.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
7) I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
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*8) I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my job in a way that
protected other people at work.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
9) I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other employees at my
organization.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
10) I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to other people
suffering at work.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
The measure was adapted from Currier et al. (2015)
1)Things I saw/experienced things that left me feeling betrayed or let-down by
educational leaders.
2) I saw people taking revenge/retribution for things that happened.
3) I feel guilt over failing to protect a student.
4) I saw the harm of an innocent student.
5) I feel guilt for being able to return to safety at the end of the workday when many
students cannot.
6) As a teacher, I had to make decisions at times when I didn’t know the right thing to do.
7) I felt betrayed or let-down by my colleagues.
8) As a teacher, I did not have access to the resources or materials I needed to care for my
students.
9) Seeing so much suffering in the students has changed me.
10) I saw students suffer because of incident(s) involving teachers or other school
personnel.
11) I came to realize that I am no longer affected by violence.
12) I saw mistakes made by teachers or other school personnel that led to the suffering of
students.
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APPENDIX B – A Measure of Morally Distressing Events
Considering your experiences at your job, select the choice that indicates how often you
have experienced each of the following situations over the past 3 months.
For the items that contain ‘someone,’ ‘others’ or ’people’ at work, refer to anyone you
are in contact with (e.g., your coworkers, clients, patients) on a regular basis.
Frequency (#) Response Scale:
1= Never, have no experience
2= Rarely, once over the three months
3= Sometimes, more than once over the three months
4= Often, every month
5= Very often, every week
6= Always, everyday
Items indicated with a * are perpetration-based items

Intensity (B) Response
Scale:
1= Not at all
2 = Very little
3 = A little
5 = Moderately
5= Quite a bit
6= Extremely

Over the past 3 months….
*1. I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions, which were
against my professional opinion.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*2. I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I believed was right
despite being against the organization’s rules.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*3. I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s protocols, which
were against my professional opinion.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*4. I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions and against
my conscience.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*5. I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to somewhere/someone else that I
believed was unsuitable.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
6. There have been situations where I believed management's interests were in
contradiction with the purpose of my work
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B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
7. I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests of our
clients/patients/customers
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
8. There have been situations where management has acted superficially and did not
serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
9. I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did not have the
ability to prevent
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
*10. I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal or to give false
information.
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?
The measure was adapted from Eizenberg et al (2009)
1. I do not have enough time to provide the patient with the care that he/she deserves.
2. I was forced to provide care to my patient according to the supervising nurse directions
against my professional opinion.
3. I pondered whether to tell the patient (who did not have the means) that he can
purchase an expensive medication not included in the ‘‘medication basket’’.
4. I was forced to invade the patient’s privacy due to inadequate conditions (e.g., a patient
in a corridor.
5. I was forced to provide care to the patient according to the physician’s directions
against my professional opinion.
6. I was forced to provide an incomplete treatment to the patient owing to work overload.
7. I was forced to keep a patient, who needed a treatment, waiting, due to lack of time.
8. I did not give the patient sufficient attention due to lack of time.
9. I was forced to treat the patient according to the physician’s directions against my
conscience.
10. I pondered what to do while witnessing deficient treatment provided by another nurse
or a physician.
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11. I was forced to ignore the patient’s questions because the physician was supposed to
address them.
12. I was forced to ignore the clients/customer patient’s family questions because my
supervisor the physician was supposed to address them.
13. I was obliged to respond to the patient, who deserved a treatment but did not get it.
14. I was forced to deny an appropriate treatment from a patient due to budget cuts.
15. I was forced to move a patient to an unsuitable department instead of providing
her/him an appropriate treatment in my department.
The measure was adapted from Lev, Sagit, Ayalon (2018)
1. I acted in a way which has been in contradiction to my professional beliefs due to
pressures by the institution’s management.
2. I confronted the staff when I perceived their behavior as being in contradiction with the
best interests of the residents.
3. There were situations in which I felt that my professional obligation to the residents
was in contradiction with the financial interest of the institution.
4. I acted in a manner which I perceived as being in the best interests of the residents,
even when it was in contradiction with the demands of the institution’s management.
5. I had difficulty handling, in a professional manner, situations of suspected abuse in the
workplace towards residents, due to the lack of cooperation or opposition by the staff.
6. There were situations in which I felt that the interest of the institution’s management
was in contradiction with the interest of the residents.
7. I felt that in situations of suspected abuse towards residents, the management acted
only superficially and not to purposefully eradicate the violence interests of the residents.
8. I felt that my personal and environmental resources have not been adequate in order to
protect the residents’ rights.
9. I confronted the institution’s management when I perceived its conduct as being in
contradiction with the best interests of the residents.
10. I felt that I have not had sufficient capacity to influence the imposition of sanctions
on a worker who behaved in an inappropriate way towards residents.
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11. I felt that I do not have sufficient capacity to work to find an alternate framework for
residents, even though in my professional opinion an institutional framework is not
suitable for them, due to the opposition of the institution’s management.
12. I felt that there has been an expectation of me to conceal or to give false information
in situations where there is suspicion of abuse.
13. I acted in a way which was in contradiction with my professional beliefs due to
concerns of losing my job.
14. I felt criticism from the staff when I advocated on behalf of family members and/or
residents.
15. I felt that in my professional work, I have been more driven by the financial
considerations of the institution than by considerations for the best interest of the
residents.
16. I had difficulty handling, in a professional manner, situations of suspected abuse
towards residents, due to lack of cooperation or opposition by the institution’s
management.
17. I acted in a way which I perceived as being in the best interests of the residents, even
when it was likely to hurt my future employment.
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APPENDIX C – A Measure of Perceived Occupational Stigma
Measure by Schaubroeck et al. (2018)
Please consider the extent to which each statement applies to your job in general.
Response Scale:
1= Strongly disagree
2= Disagree
3= Slightly Disagree
4= Neither agree nor disagree
5= Slightly Agree
6= Agree
7= Strongly agree
1. Most people would not want to associate themselves with a job like mine.
2. Few people would be proud to have my job.
3. Most people would consider my occupation disgusting or degrading.
4. People in my occupation are devalued by others.
5. People may treat me with less respect because of my occupation.
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APPENDIX D – A Measure of Mental Health Symptoms
Patient Health Questionnaire by Spitzer, Williams, Kroenke (1999)
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Measure by Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, and Lowe
(2006)
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following
problems?
Response Scale:
1= Not at all
2= Several days
3= More than half of the days
4= Nearly every day
Items indicated with a * assess anxiety.
1. Little interest or pleasure in doing things.
2. Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless.
3. Trouble falling or staying asleep or sleeping too much.
4. Feeling tried or having little energy.
5. Poor appetite or overeating.
6. Feeling bad about yourself - or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family
down.
7. Trouble concentrating on things such as reading the newspaper or watching television.
8. Moving or speaking so slowly that other people have noticed? Or the opposite - being
so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual.
9. Thoughts that you would be better off dead or hurting yourself in some way.
*10. Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge.
*11. Not being able to stop or control worrying.
*12. Trouble relaxing.
*13. Worrying too much about different things.
*14. Being so restless that it is hard to sit still.
*15. Becoming easily annoyed or irritable.
*16. Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen.
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APPENDIX E – A Measure of Meaningful work
Measure by Steger, Dik, and Duffy (2012)
Please respond to the items using the scale below.
Response Scale:
1= Definitely Untrue
2= Probably Untrue
3= Neither True nor Untrue
4= Probably True
5= Definitely True
1. I have found a meaningful career
2. I understand how my work contributes to my life’s meaning
3. I have a good sense of what makes my job meaningful.
4. I have discovered work that has a satisfying purpose.
5. I view my work as contributing to my personal growth.
6. My work helps me better understand myself.
7. My work helps me make sense of the world around me.
8. My work really makes no difference to the world. (R)
9. I know my work makes a positive difference in the world.
10. The work I do serves a greater purpose.
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APPENDIX F – A Measure of Workplace Deviance
Measure by Bennett and Robinson (2000)
Please indicate the extent to which you have engaged in each of the behaviors in the last
3 months.
Frequency Response Scale:
1= Never, have no experience
2= Rarely, once over the three months
3= Sometimes, more than once over the three months
4= Often, every month
5= Very often, every week
6= Always, everyday
1. Taken property from work without permission
2. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working
3. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business
expenses
4. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace
5. Come in late to work without permission
6. Littered your work environment
7. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions
8. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked
9. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person
10. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job
11. Put little effort into your work
12. Dragged out work in order to get overtime
13. Made fun of someone at work
14. Said something hurtful to someone at work
15. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work
16. Cursed at someone at work
17. Played a mean prank on someone at work
18. Acted rudely toward someone at work
19. Publicly embarrassed someone at work
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Table 1
Frequency of endorsement of moral suffering experiences
Item No.

Moral Suffering Experience

t1_MI1

I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that
betrayed my trust.
I have seen people taking revenge for actions that have happened at work.
t1_MI2
I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm.
t1_MI3
I have seen someone unnecessarily harmed at work.
t1_MI4
I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe
t1_MI5
when I know others at work cannot.
I failed to take action in helping someone at work.
t1_MI6
I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with.
t1_MI7
I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my job
t1_MI8
in a way that protected other people at work.
I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other
t1_MI9
employees at my organization.
t1_MI10 I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to
other people suffering at work.
t1_MD1 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions,
which were against my professional opinion.
t1_MD2 I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I
believed was right despite being against the organization’s rules.
t1_MD3 I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s
protocols, which were against my professional opinion.
t1_MD4 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions
and against my conscience.
t1_MD5 I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to
somewhere/someone else that I believed was unsuitable.
t1_MD6 There have been situations where I believed management's interests were
in contradiction with the purpose of my work
t1_MD7 I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests of
our clients/patients/customers
t1_MD8 There have been situations where management has acted superficially and
did not serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers
t1_MD9 I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did
not have the ability to prevent
t1_MD10 I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal or
to give false information.

Frequency Percent
226

47%

150
55
108
226

31%
11%
23%
47%

168
355
179

35%
74%
37%

246

51%

261

54%

200

42%

225

47%

195

41%

166

35%

155

32%

243

51%

292

61%

261

54%

265

55%

116

24%

Note. Responses were coded as (0) having never experienced that item or (1) experienced that item
at least once over the past 3 months. Data is based on the complete sample (N=699).
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Table 2
Principal axis factor analysis for the moral suffering measurement model
Item No.
Moral Suffering Experience
I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that
t1_MI1

betrayed my trust.
t1_MI2
I have seen people taking revenge for actions that have happened at work.
t1_MI3
I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm.
t1_MI4
I have seen someone unnecessarily harmed at work.
I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe when I
t1_MI5
know others at work cannot.
t1_MI6
I failed to take action in helping someone at work.
t1_MI7
I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with.
I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my job in a
t1_MI8
way that protected other people at work.
I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other
t1_MI9
employees at my organization.
t1_MI10 I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to other
people suffering at work.
t1_MD1 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions,
which were against my professional opinion.
t1_MD2 I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I believed
was right despite being against the organization’s rules.
t1_MD3 I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s protocols,
which were against my professional opinion.
t1_MD4 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions and
against my conscience.
t1_MD5 I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to somewhere/someone
else that I believed was unsuitable.
t1_MD6 There have been situations where I believed management's interests were in
contradiction with the purpose of my work
t1_MD7 I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests of our
clients/patients/customers
t1_MD8 There have been situations where management has acted superficially and did
not serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers
t1_MD9 I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did not
have the ability to prevent
t1_MD10 I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal or to
give false information.

F1

F2
.41

.45
.98
.71
.66
.70
.62

.78
.63
.64

.54
.81
.65
.78
.54
.57
.76
.67
.63
.68

Note. Principal axis factor analysis was conducted with promax rotation and robust maximum likelihood
estimator. The EFA utilized the intensity scores of the first split half sample (N = 349).
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Table 3
Factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis of the final moral suffering model
Perpetration Witness
Item No.
Moral Suffering
I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization
t1_MI1B
0.68
that betrayed my trust.
I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm.
I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with.
I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my
job in a way that protected other people at work.
I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other
t1_MI9B
employees at my organization.
t1_MI10B I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to
other people suffering at work.
t1_MD1B I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’
directions, which were against my professional opinion.
t1_MD2B I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I
believed was right despite being against the organization’s rules.
t1_MD3B I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s
protocols, which were against my professional opinion.
t1_MD4B I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’
directions and against my conscience.
t1_MD5B I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to
somewhere/someone else that I believed was unsuitable.
t1_MD6B There have been situations where I believed management's interests
were in contradiction with the purpose of my work
t1_MD7B I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests
of our clients/patients/customers
t1_MD8B There have been situations where management has acted
superficially and did not serve the best interests of
clients/patients/customers
t1_MD9B I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I
did not have the ability to prevent
t1_MD10B I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal
or to give false information.

t1_MI3B
t1_MI7B
t1_MI8B

0.65
0.68

0.75
0.72
0.75

0.83
0.82
0.85
0.84
0.64
0.8
0.76
0.8
0.67
0.66

Note. The CFA was conducted using robust maximum likelihood estimators. Items MI2, MI4, MI5, and MI6
were removed from the final model. The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted with the second split
half sample of validation dataset (N = 349).
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Table 4
Factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis of the moral suffering product scores final model
Perpetration
Witness
Item No.
Moral Suffering
I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that
t1_MI1
0.77
betrayed my trust.

t1_MI3
t1_MI7
t1_MI8

I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm.
I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with.
I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my
job in a way that protected other people at work.

0.72

t1_MI9

I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other
employees at my organization.

0.79

t1_MI10

I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to
other people suffering at work.

0.78

t1_MD1

I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’
directions, which were against my professional opinion.

0.9

t1_MD2

I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I
believed was right despite being against the organization’s rules.

0.88

t1_MD3

I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s
protocols, which were against my professional opinion.

0.87

t1_MD4

I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’
directions and against my conscience.

0.88

t1_MD5

I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to
somewhere/someone else that I believed was unsuitable.

0.73

t1_MD6

There have been situations where I believed management's interests
were in contradiction with the purpose of my work

0.89

t1_MD7

I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests
of our clients/patients/customers

0.82

t1_MD8

There have been situations where management has acted superficially
and did not serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers

0.86

t1_MD9

I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I
did not have the ability to prevent

0.74

t1_MD10

I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal
or to give false information.

0.68

0.78

0.77

Note. The CFA was conducted using robust maximum likelihood estimators. Items MI2, MI4, MI5, and MI6
were removed from the final model. The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted with the second split half
sample of validation dataset (N = 349) and utilized the product term of frequency*intensity scores.
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Table 5
Fit statistics for the final measurement models of the latent study variables
Wave N
ꭓ2
df
RMSEA
Moral Suffering Product Model
1
349 195.218
101
0.079
Perceived Occupational Stigma
1
479 44.798
5
0.189
Mental Health Symptoms
2
479 253.316
88
0.082
Meaningful Work
2
479 97.711
24
0.101

SRMR
0.041
0.055
0.048
0.022

CFI
0.954
0.942
0.950
0.977

Note. Fit statistics shown for CFAs of all study variables (latent only) at all relevant waves. Moral suffering
measurement model was based on the split half sample (N = 349) and utilized the product term of
frequency*intensity scores.
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TLI
0.945
0.883
0.941
0.965

Table 6
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among study variables
Variable
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
Control Variables
1. Age
40.56 10.98
2. Tenure
7.71
7.28
.47**
Time 1
3. Witness
5.38
6.41
0.01
-0.01
(.91)
4. Perpetration 2.01
3.23
-.11* -0.05 .34**
(.89)
5. POS
2.41
1.64
0.05
-0.01 .40** .27**
(.89)
6. MW
3.74
1.18
0.07
.16** -.32** -.10* -.36** (.95)
7. CWB
1.25
0.69
-.11* -0.04 .31** .52** .25** -0.07
8. MHS
1.66
0.84
-0.05 -0.05 .41** .25** .31** -.43**
Time 2
9. POS
2.43
1.57
0.04
0.02
.35** .22** .59** -.33**
10. MW
3.74
1.16
0.08
.18** -.28** -0.05 -.31** .80**
11. CWB
1.22
0.64
-0.09 -0.04 .21** .41** .26** -0.04
12. MHS
1.64
0.81
-.10* -0.06 .34** .22** .32** -.37**

7

8

(.93)
.31**

(.95)

.23**
-0.05
.60**
.22**

.21**
-.38**
.23**
.73**

9

10

11

12

(.91)
-.36**
.25**
.25**

(.95)
-0.06
-.40**

(.94)
.26**

(.95)

Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in parentheses in the diagonal represent Cronbach's alpha. POS
refers to perceived occupational stigma (responses ranged from 1-7), MW refers to meaningful work (responses ranged from 1-5), CWB refers to
counterproductive work behaviors (responses ranged from 1-6), and MHS refers to mental health symptoms (responses ranged from 1-4). Witness- and
perpetration-based moral suffering refers to the frequency*intensity product scores.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.

Table 7
Regression estimates for the structural models of moral suffering predicting outcomes (H1 - 3)
Standard Standardized
Hypothesis
Regression
Estimate
Error
Estimate
Witness-Based
.42**
.14
.38
1
Mental Health Symptoms ~
Perpetration-Based
.06
.14
.05
Witness-Based
-.37**
.13
-.36
2
Meaningful Work ~
Perpetration-Based
.14
.13
.14
Witness-Based
-.07
.07
-.11
Counterproductive Work
3
Behaviors ~
Perpetration-Based
.24**
.09
.38
Note. All predictors were assessed at Time 1 and all dependent variables were assessed at Time 2. The predictors
were calculated using the product term of frequency*intensity scores.
~ indicates "regressed on"
* p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 8
Regression estimates for the structural models of the interaction between moral suffering and perceived
occupational stigma predicting outcomes (H4-6)
Standard Standardized
Hypothesis
Regression
Estimate
Error
Estimate
Witness-Based
.72**
.26
.58
Perpetration-Based
1.04**
.37
.84
4
Mental Health Symptoms ~ POS
.98**
.26
.79
WBMS X POS
-.85*
.39
-.68
PBMS X POS
-.95**
.33
-.76
Witness-Based
-.20
.20
-.18
Perpetration-Based
-.57*
.28
-.51
5
Meaningful Work ~
POS
-.73**
.18
-.66
WBMS X POS
.19
.29
.17
PBMS X POS
.73**
.23
.65
Witness-Based
.04
.09
.06
Perpetration-Based
.29
.17
.46
Counterproductive Work
6
POS
.28*
.12
.44
Behaviors ~
WBMS X POS
-.25
.17
-.39
PBMS X POS
-.06
.17
-.09
Note. All predictors were assessed at Time 1 and all dependent variables were assessed at Time 2. The moral
suffering predictors were calculated using the product term of frequency*intensity scores. WBMS refers to witnessbased moral suffering, PBMS refers to perpetration-based moral suffering, and POS refers to perceived
occupational stigma.
~ indicates "regressed on"
* p < .05 ** p < .01
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